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# ***JPRS Report***

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## **West Europe**

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15 OCTOBER 1987

## WEST EUROPE

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## STRAUSS TO KEEP BAVARIAN CABINET INTACT

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 20 May 87 p 20

[Article by Michael Stiller: "Strauss Holds On to the Old Guard: The Minister President Does Not Intend to Restructure his Cabinet Before the End of the Legislative Period"]

[Text] Minister President Franz Josef Strauss does not want to restructure his cabinet, which he formed after the Bavarian parliamentary elections in the fall of 1986, on his own accord prior to the end of the legislative period in 1990. The chief of government reportedly made that clear at a meeting of the CSU committee for the state of Bavaria. Strauss thereby revised indications that he himself had given six months ago. After he had introduced his new government team to the CSU state parliamentary group at the end of October 1986, in response to questions from journalists he stated that a restructuring of the cabinet was conceivable at the end of 1988, halfway through the legislative period. He did not name names, but intimated a connection with possible changes in the CSU members of the Bonn government, which could take place in 1988.

In connection with these hints by the minister president, the names of Minister Karl Hillermeier (Labor and Social Affairs), Hans Eisenmann (Agriculture) and Anton Jaumann (Economy) were repeatedly named both internally in the CSU as well as in the press. Hillermeier, who had held the office of minister of the interior until 1986 with a marked absence of good luck, was once again named to the cabinet by Strauss--contrary to the expectations of many friends in the party--as minister for labor and social affairs as well as deputy minister president; up until now he has been regarded as a "sitting duck," especially since he is approaching the age of 65. Hans Eisenmann, whose qualifications are disputed neither within the CSU nor elsewhere, will also turn 65 in the next few years, and does not give the impression that he is glued to his seat. Of Jaumann it is said that he has health problems and it is doubtful whether he will remain in office after 1988. Jaumann will turn 60 this year.

## Letters of Protest Follow Up Speculation

According to information made available to the SZ, Strauss displayed annoyance during the CSU committee meeting about the fact that whenever reports appeared

in the newspapers speculating about the replacement of the minister for the economy, he was inundated with letters of protest from Jaumann's Swabian constituents. No one, Strauss said, could imply that such reports came from the minister president himself. He said that he called upon friends in the party not to fall for every canard cooked up by the press, and thereby disrupt the CSU. Strauss, it was said, then asked Jaumann directly whether he felt that his health would permit him to remain in office until 1990. The economics minister clearly affirmed that this was indeed true, whereupon Strauss declared that nothing would alter the fact that Jaumann had been appointed minister for four years.

Jaumann, who will soon turn over chairmanship of the CSU district of Swabia in favor of the chairman of the CSU state group in Bonn, Theo Waigel, is currently the only member of the cabinet to hale from Swabia. Hans Maier, who had also belonged to the Swabian contingent in the CSU, last year refused a reappointment to the cabinet because Strauss wanted to appoint him only to the post of minister of science. Since then, the Swabian CSU has reacted especially sensitively to reports that Jaumann could possibly fall victim to a reshuffling of the cabinet.

His spokesman Bernd Lenze observed that Strauss had addressed the problem on his own volition. Jaumann in any case always knew "how an appointment to the cabinet is handled. He had no doubts there." Strauss, Lenze said, assured the minister also "on another occasion" that he was minister for four years and that he, the minister president, "considered his work good." References to the state of Jaumann's health, Lenze said, had been "vile gossip from the very beginning. Moreover, he said that Jaumann felt particularly obligated to remain in the cabinet on behalf of Swabia.

As far as Hillermeier and Eisenmann are concerned, according to information received by the SZ, Strauss reported to the CSU committee that both had told him when they were appointed to the cabinet at the end of last year that it could be that for personal reasons they would not remain in office for the full term. This meant that it was entirely up to the two men whether or not they belonged to the government or left prematurely. Hillermeier, at least has recently given the impression that he felt that he was appointed for another four years and was by no means contemplating a premature departure. Eisenmann had a communication sent to the SZ that he did not participate in "such speculations and combinations," and refused to comment.

## Uneasy Crown Princes

In the CSU, the fact that Strauss of his own volition came to speak of his cabinet was viewed as an attempt to assuage rising unrest in the governing party. The cause of the feelings of insecurity was not so much the Swabian problem with Jaumann, but above all the concern that Strauss could bring to Munich as Eisenmann's successor next year the former Miesbach district administrator Wolfgang Groebl, who in the meantime in a lightning career has been advanced to the position of state secretary in the ministry for the environment in Bonn. Groebl is considered an intimate friend of Strauss and was recently treated as the man whom the minister president could one day introduce as his successor. With these rumors the unrest reached the level of those CSU politicians who regard themselves as Strauss' crown princes: Finance Minister Max Streibl, the chairman of the CSU state parliamentary group Gerold Tandler and also the minister in the state chancellery, Edmund Stoiber. (Cf. also the commentary on page 4.)

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## STALINIST PRESS ORGAN REPORTS ON SKP(Y) MEETINGS, DOCUMENTS

## Central Committee Prepares Agenda

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 2 Jun 87 p 11

[Article: "Changes to Documents on Basis of Membership Debate"]

[Text] The Central Committee of SKP [Finnish Communist Party] Organizations convened for the last time in its present composition on Saturday and Sunday and discussed preparations for the 21st Congress of the SKP(Unity) to be held in Espoo's Dipoli next weekend.

The Central Committee heard Chairman Taisto Sinisalo's speech on the political situation and the policy report for the congress, a summary of the organizational discussion of the drafts of the policy report and party document as well as a presentation of the initiatives made by 40 party organizations to the congress.

The organizational debate on documents has been quite animated. For example, approximately 90 written statements, which have contained more than 1,000 different comments, were presented for the political document. There were even more verbal stances.

Documents and other issues to be dealt with by the congress have also been debated by committees making preparations for the congress as well as by sections subordinate to the Central Committee. In addition, an animated debate has been conducted in TIEDONANTAJA's "Straight to the Point" column.

The Central Committee was able to confirm that considerable changes were made to the documents as a result of the organizational discussion. It was emphasized in the Central Committee that this debate must be unconditionally continued and be transformed into a debate concerning the party program reform.

The Central Committee adopted the proposals as policy and party documents for the congress and also decided on the Central Committee's policy report to the congress as well as on answers to initiatives.

## Invitation to Celebration

The Central Committee also approved drafts for an appeal to the SDP's party congress and to the congress of the SKP led by Arvo Aalto.

The Central Committee stated that the congress will be attended by an extensive international community, which is a manifestation of the communist movement's internationalism and the party's traditionally good relations with fraternal parties.

The Central Committee pointed out that it is organizing a celebration of major national and international significance in connection with the congress and issued a last-minute invitation to those who have not yet been informed or who have not yet made a decision to participate.

## Chairman Taisto Sinisalo: Finnish Support for Warsaw Pact's Security Initiatives

The security initiatives made at the summit meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Berlin are also worthy of the complete support of Finland and its people, stated Chairman Taisto Sinisalo in a speech to the Central Committee of SKP Organizations on Saturday.

The elimination of medium-range and even shorter range missiles from Europe as part of actions on behalf of a nuclear-free world is at the center of attention, said Sinisalo.

A chain of increasingly new subterfuges has been raised in NATO circles against the initiatives made by the USSR and the other socialist countries.

It has become increasingly evident that a struggle is being waged for profound changes in the international situation, in which the obsolete concepts of the Cold War and power politics, on the one hand, and the new idea aimed at creating a general security system, on the other hand, are in conflict with each other.

The initiative made by the summit meeting of Warsaw Pact member countries to NATO on discussions concerning military doctrines and strategies is aimed at a rejection of the whole security concept based on nuclear intimidation and the arms race. This is a continuation of the Warsaw Pact's policy line, which emphasizes purely defensive premises. In addition to European nuclear disarmament, the initiatives of the Warsaw Pact countries will open up the path for negotiations concerning the reduction of conventional weapons and armed forces within the framework of the CSCE.

The security initiatives of the Warsaw Pact also deserve the full support of Finland and its people.

As far as the security of Finland and the Nordic area is concerned, anxiety is aroused by the fact that the USA and its allies are trying to circumvent nuclear disarmament with proposals to change medium-range missiles deployed

in Western Europe into shorter range missiles and to move land-based cruise missiles to sea areas. Such solutions would not reduce, but would increase the threat in the Nordic area also. Therefore, Finland cannot adopt a neutral attitude toward them or be silent, but our country must clearly declare its stance against these plans. This is now also timely for promoting a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

#### Moscow Meeting Important

The new situation in Europe and the Nordic area is at the same time an encouragement to promote actions of the peace movement, nationwide preparations for UN Disarmament Week, among other things, pointed out Sinisalo.

In his speech to the Central Committee of SKP Organizations Chairman Sinisalo also discussed the proposal made by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev on cooperation among communist and other progressive parties in an interview given to l'UNITA.

In recognizing the negative attitude of certain parties toward international meetings of communist parties as a serious problem, General Secretary Gorbachev announced the CPSU's proposal that an unofficial meeting of representatives of various parties and popular movements would be arranged in connection with the 70th anniversary of the October Revolution. There it could be possible to conduct an extensive debate on important questions occupying the minds of people in the whole world. Gorbachev emphasizes the absolute necessity of preventing a nuclear war as the basis of relations between progressive forces.

It is natural that Finnish Communists, the Central Committee of SKP organizations -- and certainly even other progressive forces in our country -- greet this kind of a proposal with great satisfaction.

The CPSU's positive initiative also meets the most urgent security needs of the people in addition to the need to promote international cooperation, in general.

#### Preparations for Congress and Festivities

Chairman Sinisalo extensively discussed preparations for the 21st Congress of the SKP(Unity) in his speech. He stated that the preparations for the meeting to begin in Espoo's Dipoli next Friday have created a good foundation for beginning a new phase in our country's communist movement. The resolutions in the draft documents for the congress, are, without a doubt, significant from the point of view of broader cooperation among anti-right wing forces as well as assembling the SKP's forces.

The extensive international participation in the congress illustrates the communist movement's internationalism in a graphic manner and the development of our party's traditionally good relations with fraternal parties.

The festivities being arranged in connection with the congress will perhaps become the largest mass event of the October Revolution and the jubilee year of Finland's independence.

### Sinisalo On Party Split

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 11 Jun 87 pp 8-10

[Interview with Taisto Sinisalo by Tapio Kari and Risto Repo]

[Text] Taisto Sinisalo has spent many years in leadership positions in the Finnish Communist Party, as a member and vice-chairman of the Political Committee [Politburo], among others.

After the party was split at the 20th Congress with the efforts of the so-called axing line, Sinisalo has served on the chairmanship of the Unity Committee of SKP Organizations and as chairman of the Central Committee of SKP Organizations, which was formed in the spring of last year. This weekend the SKP(Unity) led by Sinisalo will hold its congress in Espoo's Dipoli.

We will conclude the series "Answers from the Left" with Sinisalo's interview. Those interviewed previously were Antti Eskola, Klaus Makela, Jouko Kajanoja, Kalevi Sorsa, Marja Jarvela, Jorma Hentila, and Reino Paasilinna.

[Question] An exceptionally thorough and critical debate on the party and its situation has been conducted in TIEDONANTAJA prior to the SKP(Unity) congress. Hardly anything has been spared. What has been your feeling when opening up TIEDONANTAJA in the morning.

[Answer] For me it is valuable that TIEDONANTAJA has in recent months opened up a debate on cooperation of left-wing forces in a manner which will hopefully become more profound and acquire even other forums. Now it is regrettably narrow. TIEDONANTAJA is a positive exception in this respect. I am referring to that debate in which the Social Democrats and others outside of our movement also participated. Actually, such an opening in the development of the paper has in part been a basis for the fact that an intellectual atmosphere has been created for an open debate concerning my own work also.

I consider a party debate to be very important. I have saved all the speeches, which number approximately 70 so far according to my calculations. It has produced a lot. Also the debate conducted in the organizations has been more open than before, perhaps there has been a reciprocal influence between the debates conducted in the newspaper and the organizations.

Certainly there have been blows both above and below the belt, but a debate cannot be opened if these are made into a problem. The totality has been positive.

I would emphasize two circumstances. There is now a new level in our debate. Even before the meeting in Tampere, we were still debating the existence of the party, the party in itself, and the need for it. Now the treatment of

this basic question has been continued and politics, in particular, have also been discussed, there has been an effort to find the party's place in a changed society. This has been a productive and even new matter.

but, on the other hand, issues are being looked at from a rather limited point of view. I do not want to mention any issue in particular, but whoever writes about this or that question looks at overall policy and the party through that screen and from that point of view. This is a question of growth and not a matter of concern.

[Question] It has become clear in the party debate that there are many different avenues of approach and open questions in the SKP(Unity). Will the debate now conclude here or how will the process continue?

[Answer] The congress will hopefully be able to provide some answers to some of the questions. It will at least provide some lines of demarcation, which will create a more solid foundation from which to operate, and our common task is to understand the contribution of the congress in such a way that our debate and our work will be directed at accomplishing the decisions and policy line of the congress.

But, certainly, no one is setting down such a task for the congress that it must resolve all the problems facing us. Publicity is, of course, an inevitable element in deliberating new questions, and when it is proposed to the congress that a party conference should be held next year to debate the draft of the ideological and political theses connected with the program work, a continued debate will thus actually be opened up by this.

But, of course, the decisions of the congress must also be understood as an operational guideline and not just as an opening for a debate. Naturally, the party will not just debate, but will also accomplish those decisions which the congress will make.

[Question] In other words, those many issues which are still open will not be buried in the debate preceding the next congress to be held after 3 years, as some fear?

[Answer] I repeat that the congress itself will open up the debate on program questions. There are differing thoughts on whether we can talk about a program draft next year already. I have the understanding that we should not rush into any program resolutions, but deliberate those issues which will provide material for the resolutions. We have 3 years in which to prepare if we consider that the program will be brought up at the next regular congress.

The debate will also be livened up by the fact that the congress to be held in the Cultural House will apparently approve a program which will be described as the program of the entire communist movement in Finland. Our task is to feel a responsibility for the whole party even in this sense.

[Question] In the speeches published in TIEDONANTAJA, there has been a certain division regarding the debate by the congress of the draft of the future

political document. Some consider it good to adopt a kind of department store approach in which all demands are included, and in the opinion of others it should be a battle flag leading the way for a great idea and direction. What is your own preference?

[Answer] It must be remembered that this document will not in this sense be a popular edition and that we would be compiling a program of agitation which will give the SKP's answer to all questions. This is not even the goal. Naturally, reprints will be made on the bases of the political document and issues will be raised from it. On the other hand, it will not be a program either even though there has clearly been this kind of an emphasis in the debate.

I have studied the documents of some of the fraternal parties and in my opinion our document is valid. I just attended the congress of the Greek Communist Party, and they were faced with very similar issues. After debating whether they should compile narrow or broad documents, the only document of the Greek party's congress, theses, is 160 pages. A document should be a guideline in the work to be accomplished at a congress, in mass organizations, and in the trade union movement.

It is understandable that consideration has been given to whether this or that approach is good. The SKP has experience in different kinds of documents, and they have generally also contained a section dealing with demands. Since five parties are holding congresses at approximately the same time in Finland, and if we were to propose only a broad policy line and not take a stance on the politics of the day, this would be a major deficiency.

[Question] Has the document to be presented to the congress changed appreciably from that draft which was sent out for organizational debate a couple months ago?

[Answer] It has changed. It has been clarified and has been brought closer to the daily life and work of the people and organizations. It could have been made even closer. One of the premises of the political document is that we will strive to pose questions on the basis of which people will be motivated to initiate their own actions. Life is to be taken in all its varied forms and colors.

The document also includes certain questions of a theoretical nature, which have aroused a debate on the question of neo-conservatism, for example. It has been said that neo-conservatism is a fabricated concept. The international communist movement uses this name for the more aggressive part of bourgeois politics, and this does not mean a return to the old and tried right-wing conservatism.

In Finland, neo-conservatism is connected with the so-called structural changes in capitalism, for example, and it must be analyzed for the reason that Finland's leading right-wing party, the Conservative Party, has made major changes in its own tactics. One must seek a fundamental essence and not

look, for example, at how the Conservative Party adapts to peaceful coexistence. The Conservative Party is going around issues confronting us in a very modern time, but it is doing this under rather drastic right-wing conditions and is pushing through a conservative ideology and a cold conservative policy line. A slightly deeper scrutiny with which neo-conservatism is being examined in the document is very important when one thinks about the present situation in Finland.

[Question] When one looks at the Finnish workers' movement from the left wing of the SDP or even from the whole SDP to the extreme left wing, a "crisis of the workers' movement" is frequently mentioned or the argument is presented that the left wing has lost the ball in Finnish society. What do you yourself think about the future of the left-wing or the progressive movement?

[Answer] It is an indisputable fact that the Finnish workers' movement is in a crisis. Whoever may argue otherwise is wrong. Perhaps the situation is such that the Communists would like to place themselves outside of this crisis.

Already the mere fact that such a crisis situation exists places a great responsibility on us. I think that we have not known how to analyze all aspects of the situation. We are too close to the elections, for example. An election evaluation has been made, there has been a discussion of the election results, even though there are more profound issues in question than those being measured in connection with the elections.

The greatest deficiency of the left-wing movement is that it is not able to analyze the situation in the same direction even from the beginning. A common assessment of the situation is lacking. Otherwise, one cannot understand the fact that such completely different resolutions have been made in government issues, for example.

It would certainly not be detrimental if the social democratic movement were to deliberate what role the left-wing Social Democrats have played, in general, in the development of the social democratic movement. At certain times, there have always been left-wing social democratic trends in the SDP, and, indeed, the workers' movement is at this time in need of a clear left-wing social democratic assessment. Regrettably, even this does not exist.

[Question] Nevertheless, there is some kind of embryonic development in the left wing of the Social Democratic Party?

[Answer] Indeed, there is, and unless this situation in which social democracy finds itself raises left-wing criticism in the SDP, then I do not know at what stage this can, in general, be expected.

This is a sensitive issue, but it should still be debated openly. We do not have a position against the Social Democrats when we talk about the need for left-wing social democracy. We do not have a secret plot to divide the social democratic movement and to cause difficulties for it, but a deep concern for the entire workers' movement.

It can be said of the trade union movement that if it does not undergo a re-evaluation soon, the crisis will be quite profound. The fact that employers deduct trade union membership dues directly from wages keeps the trade union movement in Finland outside of a visible organizational crisis. Everything appears to be very good. The trade union movement keeps growing and improving in appearance, but it is only a shell covering the truth.

If such a profound alienation as what now seems to be happening in the participation in trade union elections occurs in the trade union movement, it will, indeed, become a serious matter from the point of view of the future of the entire trade union movement.

Even in this respect I would hope that the left-wing social democratic debate would continue and become deeper. We Communists should also have a greater readiness to conduct debates and deliberate problems, find points in common. Social Democrats and Communists should deliberate issues together, especially in that area, and we Communists have a great responsibility in this.

[Question] The fact that the percentage of those voting remained low in the congress elections of the SDP as well as the SKP can also be considered as a sign of a crisis although in some circles of the SKP(Unity) it was much greater. Is it such that the traditional organization of the workers' parties no longer attracts people in the present-day world and that former channels no longer work?

[Answer] Certainly, there are elements of an organizational crisis in the social democratic movement and also the communist movement. If one were to argue otherwise about the SKP, one would be talking nonsense.

The problems are the most profound in this respect among the Social Democrats. A living party rank and file is actually lacking completely from social democracy at this time. It does not have any party organizations in the old traditional sense of the word. Since only three sections presented initiatives to Aalto's party congress, a total of perhaps ten initiatives, and since only a few notations were made in the draft program, approximately 20 notations to the rule changes, of which half concerns the method of electing a chairman and a general secretary, this tells of a considerable passiveness. In this sense it is exceptionally good that we have succeeded in conducting a broad debate.

Naturally, social change also touches organizations. I would imagine that if we know how to apply traditional forms of operation but from a slightly different tact, take the issues to the people and give them an opportunity to participate and not just to listen to speeches, perhaps then we will find the old power of appeal of the workers' movement. People came to the workers' organizations for the reason that they could themselves influence the course of social development. If we are able to break through this introspection which is one of the greatest deficiencies in our organizational work and build new forms without prejudice, I believe that a channel can be found.

Much, for example, is being said about the political passiveness of youth. But think, for example, about the youth peace movement and Nuorallatanssi, which is probably one of the strongest youth organizations. It is based on the fact that youth have found their own channel of influence on affairs which they believe to be important. The movement to occupy housing is one form. I do not believe that the rise of workers' organizations can come from any other source than social problems and needs.

And, indeed, the party document being compiled for our congress will attempt to ventilate the organizational rank and file. This means organizational reforms in which we would dare to look at the area distribution of sections, courageously increase job site sections, combine area sections, and so on. This will be one of the more important openings of the congress.

[Question] A week ago, the SKP published a study concerning its own membership and the result was quite gloomy. The average age in the party is quite high and younger people in the party have a rather critical attitude toward it. To what degree does this study reflect the problems of the entire SKP?

[Answer] In my opinion, it is worth asking why this study was made so visibly public before the congress. This seems peculiar in that silence which otherwise surrounded the preparations for Aalto's congress. And since the study does not inspire with its content, then one has to ask what was its objective. Is the purpose to open up such a debate in which openings could be made to the right, lose the communist legacy which we have preserved, and label our tradition as obsolete? But this is another matter.

It must be remembered that the SKP has divided and is dividing along a certain ideological and political basis, and in this respect the legacy of the 1970s is dividing in a completely different manner. We acquired many young people and an activism. Therefore, it is not possible to think that the study would be directly comparable to our organizations.

On the other hand, it would be a grave error to be lulled into the idea that things are much better with us. Paying attention to youth work and activities is one of the most important issues. If a political movement does not have youth activities, it is very difficult to find points in common with young people.

But it must also be said that the communist movement needs all kinds of people. It is not right to make it a sin that it includes older people. It is not their sin, but their merit.

[Question] A large number of those who came into the communist movement in the 1970s, especially among the young intelligentsia, have put a critical distance between themselves and the movement even though they feel a sympathy toward Communists. How can a living connection be made with this group again?

[Answer] An assessment should be made of the 1970s. In fighting the rise of leftist radicals, the right wing at that time adopted a very organized and

powerful initiative, and the right wing's hold has been apparent in the same manner in the debate on the 1970s. The whole era is being painted in the wrong colors. It was, however, a time when broad youth groups came closer to the philosophy of the working class than perhaps ever before with the exception of the beginning of this century -- that time when Otto Wille and others joined the movement was certainly in some respect the same.

Mistakes were, indeed, made, but this is not what was most essential in the 1970s. One threshold would be to clarify the legacy of the 1970s as a matter of conscience. Many certainly have an erroneous concept of that time even in connection with their own activities, and even here one can see how the party has squandered time elsewhere and has not been able to analyze this very important period. Books about this era have been written by other people, the right-wing analysis of the 1970s even extends to pure literature.

But, of course, the issue will not be resolved even by bringing up memories. We should continue from the 1970s: what were those factors which alienated people from involvement? Where were the mistakes made in that period when this kind of estrangement occurred?

As far as researchers are concerned, the situation is that many are currently conducting important Marxist research, but each in his own academic ivory tower. I do not believe that Finland is still a backward country in Marxist research. But this research is not being performed within our movement.

If we are not able to resolve the coordination of research activity, then perhaps we are going too far away to seek solutions. The establishment of a Marxist research institute, for which initiatives have been made, is a matter worth pursuing. But since there are no realistic resources at this time, other means must be found. The party must draw closer to Marxist researchers.

We have succeeded in combining the party and research in many specialized areas. For example, environmental policy in which we have raised many questions in the debate, and decisively for the reason that the youth of the 1970s have made their contribution in this area. The Central Committee has nearly 30 sections, in which expertise is assembled, and they include more than 400 members. Many of the sections function quite actively. Such an aspiration based on work which attracts experts is in the right direction. And those who came into many of the party organizations in the 1970s are, indeed, the driving force. It is not worth spending time on mere gloomy thoughts.

[Question] One issue which occupies people's minds is the party's attitude toward real socialism. One hears the accusation that when there was a certain reactionary phase in the USSR, the SKP was silent about it and even criticized those who brought up problems. Now, once again, we are the first to be included when a rather critical debate is being conducted in the USSR. Is this not being a dishonest turncoat?

[Answer] Naturally, we are talking about difficult phases, and this is not the first time, but a similar situation has occurred even before. I am referring to the time after the disclosure of the cult of Stalin. The problems are now similar.

We must first consider the arguments of solidarity. When we proceed from the fact that solidarity with the Soviet Union and real socialism is a central element in our policy, what then can be its basis? Its basis can be nothing other than the fact that solidarity is a solidarity with the party of any one country and its work. The Soviet Union is in an exceptional position in this respect.

Perhaps, a partially incorrect impression of what has occurred has also been generated. I remember very well in the beginning of the 1980s when the SKP leadership still sat together at a seminar in Moscow, in which Soviet scholars brought up the same problems about which we are now talking, bottlenecks in economic growth, for example. Indeed, the problems have been seen, and there has been an attempt to address them.

I do not know whether the mistake has been in the fact that we have not known how to apply to our work the awareness of that search which has been conducted in the Soviet Union for a longer period of time. We have been guilty of giving a one-sided and embellished picture. In some respect this is affected by the severity of that struggle which has been waged for solidarity with real socialism. It has not left much room for deliberation. Finnish Communists have not been unaware of the low level of the productivity of Soviet construction work. Since people have travelled there and observed that the construction of a building consumes an unreasonable amount of time, this has produced a different understanding than on the first trip to the Soviet Union when one saw many construction cranes and came to the conclusion that construction activity is impressive. Also our awareness has increased.

But how could it have been our affair, in what way could we have become involved in it? A public debate would not, in any case, have provided any opportunities for it. It is doubtful that relations between fraternal parties will be such in the future that the SKP, for example, could with its resources become an economic mentor for the Soviet Union even though we were to understand an issue in a slightly different manner. That which we have criticized as being anti-Soviet has called all of real socialism into question.

I was studying in Moscow when the cult of Stalin was disclosed and after that I was the district secretary in Kymenlaakso. At that time, naturally, there was no other path than to be the first to go along with the CPSU's new resolutions and the same situation prevails today. It would not have made any sense to begin deliberating whether Gorbachev will manage or not or something on that order.

But we must accept the doctrine that socialism must be better understood. Recent development will help us to adopt a more open attitude, to consider without prejudice the building of socialism in China, Hungary, or Yugoslavia, for example, and not to draw only one conclusion with respect to each issue.

Socialism is much more diversified and is seeking a path by means of much more difficult processes than has been imagined.

[Question] There is now much talk about reform among Communists. What do you understand this reform to mean?

[Answer] The breakthrough of new thinking and the whole matter of perestroyka [reform] began from a new assessment of the international situation. Naturally, it is the largest challenge of the time, it became necessary to grab the bull by the horns since mankind was being led to destruction in the form of the arms race. But there are still many problems to be considered, it is said even understanding the mutual relationship between the task of saving mankind and the class struggle all the way to the end. I do not believe that the communist movement has clarified this completely even for itself if anything can be completely clarified. Not to mention the fact that this matter has been sufficiently deliberated in the rank and file and in the organizations as well as in the preparations for the congress.

Perestroyka is also centrally connected with the building of socialism and particularly with the personal role of people in it. The spirit of perestroyka in the Soviet Union is that the people must become the master of their own house and that the method of accomplishing this is the comprehensive expansion of democracy. This finds its source from the point of view always declared by Communists that the building of socialism, if anything, is a subjective task.

The entire communist movement should learn to reform in such a way that it would know how to build its work not just on the development of the party's internal democracy but also on such factors which will, indeed, bring people closer to the struggle on behalf of socialism as a force in our own country also. The direct participation of the people is a major issue, and in this we have certainly advanced less in our perestroyka than in understanding the international situation in a manner demanded by the times.

[Question] The SKP has become divided from an organizational point of view also. What possibility do you still see for the unification of the party or for the development of cooperation in the first phase, especially since there does not appear to be any major differences in practical policies at this time between the SKP(Unity) and Aalto's SKP?

[Answer] There is no reason to build illusions. The job will be easier if we are able to assess the situation more realistically. As far as the entire people's democratic movement is concerned, disruptive actions are still continuing, for example, in the youth movement, the women's movement, and in the trade union movement. A pause or a break has not yet been achieved. The SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] is not even prepared to talk with Deva [Democratic Alternative]. This demonstrates where they think the process is now going.

We have prepared a letter for the congress to be held in the Cultural House, and uppermost has been the idea that the cause of unity must not be lost,

the prospect of unity must be preserved. And this position is not dictated just by historical optimism, but it is a task connected with our time.

This also brings us to that conclusion that we must strengthen the organization and ideological work of communists with the resources that we have. The stronger our own organization, the greater the opportunities for assembling communist forces.

We must also deliberate what can be done here and now. Forms of cooperation, perhaps even from traditions, must be found particularly in the area of politics. Since we are making preparations to celebrate the traditions of 1917 and 1918, it would seem unreasonable if no points in common were to be found. I am completely certain that as the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the party approaches, it will be possible to find opportunities for cooperation at the basic level.

Finland's political life is centered around the elections and, therefore, the elections threaten to become a exacerbating factor. We are faced with elections in the Metal Workers' Union, the presidential elections, and the municipal elections. The SKDL is not ready for any kind of cooperation in the presidential elections, but it could be easier to find a basis for cooperation from among the rank and file in the elections of the Metal Workers' Union. The idea of joint election alliances should not be disregarded in the municipal elections, thus real and not just technical election alliances.

Points of contact should be maintained. I know many communities in which many who are visibly involved in Aalto's party are of the opinion that we should go into the municipal elections with joint election alliances. This will not be easy.

#### Editor Compares Factions' Stands

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 5 Jun 87 p 2

[Commentary by Chief Editor Erkki Susi: "On the Threshold of New Thinking"]

[Text] The 21st Congress of the SKP(Unity) will be a meeting of new thinking.

In my opinion, this is not an exaggeration if we also add that we are still on the threshold of new thinking.

The germs of new thinking were already included in the Tampere meeting held a full year ago, but considerable progress has been made in the documents of the 21st Congress.

For example, the section of the political document which deals with the world situation, peace, Finland's international position and foreign policy, Western integration, and questions of cooperation between Finland and the USSR, and Finland and CEMA as well as general European cooperation displays at least a good effort to adopt new thinking.

In my opinion, its strongest aspect is that in addition to being internationalist it is also profoundly nationalist. International questions and tasks are examined specifically from the point of view of Finland and Finnish Communists.

In numerous connections I have argued that the political document is in this jubilee independence year a real program of struggle on behalf of Finland's independence. Also with respect to domestic policy. The concept of independence held by the working class also includes the idea of an independent people who are protected in their living conditions and rights.

In the document the SKP(Unity) comes out as a Finnish party, a national force. Without being an internationalist party it could not be this, as the congress documents of Aalto's Central Committee demonstrate in a regrettable manner.

The analysis of many new phenomena is just beginning in the SKP(Unity), which is also unavoidably reflected in the political document. Acceptance of the document will not, of course, mean an end to the deliberation of these issues. On the contrary, this is a good place from which to begin. The program reform work awaits us.

Anatoliy Dobrynin pointed out at the 75th anniversary seminar of PRAVDA that new thinking is not anything final, closed, and unchanging in all aspects. New thinking is a permanent ability to understand and think through new phenomena and seek new solutions.

Thus new thinking is not a prescription for a miracle cure that can be obtained from the pharmacy as long as the prescription is renewed. The ability of new thinking will be tested again every day.

Another subject.

It is still difficult for outsiders and even members of the SKP to understand the party's peculiar situation. And no wonder.

The 21st Congress of the SKP will be held a week apart in two different places as two different events at the request of two different central committees.

The independence of these two sections and also the nature of both meetings as the 21st Congress of the SKP will be reflected by international participation in them.

The SKP, which is dependent on unified ideological and political policies of the SKP while continuing to develop them as well as on unified SKP regulations and membership cards, will convene in Dipoli. It has attached the name unity to differentiate itself from Aalto's party.

The Cultural House will play host to the party which officially carries the name SKP and which has rejected half of the SKP's organizations and more than

half of its members, has given up the SKP's unified membership card, and also intends to renounce its program and regulations. Thus the name is old, but the party is new in its most essential aspects.

Thus it is not a question of any kind of Siamese twins. Also not in respect to the attitude adopted toward dissolution. The SKP(Unity) does not approve the dissolution of the party. Aalto's Central Committee has made a conscious effort to divide the party.

Contrary to Aalto's Central Committee, the SKP(Unity) is not harassing the other faction and its membership outside of the communist movement.

#### Important Stage For Party

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 5 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Important Phase in SKP's History"]

[Text] The 21st Congress of the SKP(Unity), which will convene over the weekend, is an important new phase in the nearly 70-year history of our party. This congress will confirm with its decisions the fact that there will remain in this country a combative Marxist-Leninist SKP, which will act comprehensively and creatively develop a policy line. This congress will confirm that the plans compiled in cerebral kilns of the opponents for eliminating a revolutionary party from our country have completely fizzled.

The 21st Congress of the SKP is not just an important stage only for our party, but in the life of the entire workers' and progressive movement and the whole country. The SKP(Unity) has plenty to say about this to Finland and to Finns, more than any other party has to say. Above all, the draft of the political document prepared for the congress contains a group of new proposals and initiatives about the international situation, our country's international and foreign policy as well as Finnish society.

Numerous delegations from fraternal parties and other foreign guests will participate in the congress. International participation graphically illustrates the importance of internationalism and the development of the SKP's traditionally good relations with fraternal parties. We extend our heartfelt welcome to our guests and we hope that the congress will be rewarding for them.

The congress will climax in a festival. The festival will most likely be the largest mass event in our country in connection with the jubilee year of Finland's independence and the October Revolution. In addition, the festival will, of course, be a demonstration of the struggle and unified will of Communists and their friends and a most timely political demonstration against conservative politics and for a world free of nuclear weapons, our country's independence, and the interests and rights of workers.

We hope that comrades and friends from near and far will make this festival an unforgettable event.

## SDP Attacked

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 5 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "To The Left or Toward A Crisis"]

[Text] The Finnish Social Democratic Party is presently holding its 34th Congress in Helsinki. The election of a new party leadership as well as the approval of a new program of principles are on the agenda.

The SDP is holding its congress in a very exceptional situation. In the background are an election defeat and an alliance with the Conservative Party around a joint government program.

The congress presently in session has already criticized and even severely so the commitment of the Social Democratic Party to "competitive ability" and "controlled structural change" marketed by big capital. The critics have, however, been people other than representatives of the party's visible leadership. Self-criticism has not apparently reached the party office.

Speeches at the congress do not as such help. Neither does the new program of principles. The latter is not a cure for anything also for the reason that the vagueness of the program automatically leads the SDP in the old direction.

A policy solution, a clear political choice is, however, an inevitability for the SDP. Present policy will absolutely corrupt the party. There is no longer any place to go on the right.

A proposal to turn to the left, where the SDP belongs, has already been presented to the congress.

A turn to the left and a renunciation of the competitive ability tune by the SDP would be in accordance with the interests of the workers' movement as well as the majority of Finns.

An SDP that is turning to the left would open up better opportunities for the entire workers' movement to build hegemony for the progressive movement.

## Program Documents Discussed

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 10 Jun 87 pp 8-9

[Article by Risto Uljas: "New Openings in Political Document, Finland Building Peace and Cooperation"]

[Text] The SKP(Unity) is proposing that Finland begin actively promoting general European cooperation and detente as an alternative to the threat of war and Western integration, which will intensify confrontation.

Numerous important initiatives aimed at this are contained in the political document, which the SKP(Unity) congress adopted last Sunday. Certain proposals were stated more precisely in the Central Committee's political report presented by Taisto Sinisalo.

Among other things, the document contains the proposal that Finland carry out unilateral disarmament measures by reducing the size of its army, decreasing arms procurements, shortening the time of service for recruits, and reducing the number of military refresher courses.

The view that war is not possible in the Nordic area and it must be precluded from the sphere of possibility is in the background of this proposal. Political measures and resources, which include, for example, more effective air and sea surveillance, will be needed to guarantee security in place of armed forces.

The SKP(Unity) continues to propose the acceleration of a nuclear-free Nordic zone and a joint meeting of the workers' movement of Nordic countries with this purpose, among other things, in mind.

Numerous new initiatives are being proposed for the promotion of cooperation between states and peoples. The intent of these initiatives is to activate the development of detente. These include, among other things, proposals according to which Finland will offer to host CSCE meetings regarding the overall European economy and environmental protection.

Correspondingly, it is assumed that Finland will work to promote general European cooperation in the area of technology and, for example, to limit the Eureka project to peaceful purposes only, and also to open it up to the socialist countries and public supervision.

These proposals are positive, cooperation building alternatives to that discriminatory integration which excludes socialist countries and which ties our country to the politics and influence of supranational capital.

The SKP(Unity) continues to emphasize the expansion and diversification of Finnish and Soviet cooperation. The initiatives include, among other things, cooperation in space and a Finnish-Soviet space flight as a part of it.

According to the SKP(Unity), Finland should join CEMA's scientific-technical cooperation program and promote cooperation between CEMA and EFTA.

Instead of the aspiration to exploit developing countries, it is demanded that Finland support the independent development of these countries, which means that Finnish banks should make preparations to cancel the debts of developing countries.

#### **The Teaching of New Thinking**

According to Hannu Nieminen, the numerous international policy initiatives now presented by the SKP(Unity) are a result of the debate which has been

going on for a long time already about the international situation and Finland's role.

"We have criticized passiveness and a low profile in questions of peace and detente. The concept of new thinking raised by the CPSU and General Secretary Gorbachev, which springs from a comprehensive responsibility for guaranteeing the survival of mankind, has given a completely new impetus to these discussions.

"This is a profound philosophical obligation for us Communists, but what does it mean to us in practice, in Finland's class struggle situation, and to Finland? For this purpose we have now presented a number of concrete answers and proposals, whose accomplishment is the objective of our future work.

"It should be noted that we are raising to the forefront our national interests, which are combined with the interests of all mankind on a worldwide basis, in the final count, survival. We have examined Finland's role on this basis and have arrived at the initiatives now proposed for the purpose of developing it.

"The demand for the active promotion of cooperation between states also follows Kekkonen's active foreign policy line. In accordance with this we know that a small country can have a positive effect with its activism under tense international conditions. Finland's exceptional position and experience give us those very opportunities to rise to a key position in the promotion of peace, detente, and international cooperation.

"Perhaps, this is that most important premise for the initiatives now being formulated by us. We want Finland to actively begin the work of building bridges and cooperation on the path to a secure world free of weapons.

"At the same time, it should be observed that general appeals are not sufficient. Therefore, we are also proposing several initiatives for strengthening cooperation in the workers' movement in the Nordic area and throughout all of Europe. This is urgently needed in order to answer supranational capital."

An initiative for a meeting of representatives of Europe's trade unions is being proposed to the Finnish trade union movement in the political report. In its support is also given to the convening of an international negotiating session of communist parties.

Proposals for a broad-based discussion forum of progressive forces, for example, on independence day as well as for making UN Day, 24 October, a local holiday, continue to be connected with the promotion of peace and our national interests.

In addition to new proposals, the determination of tasks in numerous questions of peace work and Finnish and Soviet cooperation brought up previously has been intensified and made more profound in the most recent stances of the SKP(Unity).

Along with the international side the SKP(Unity) has significantly developed its evaluation of our country's domestic and economic policies also and has defined goals and operational lines based on this.

#### Gap Being Reduced

Hannu Nieminen considers it clear that the debate and preparation process of the political document has been positive and has increased the collective consciousness and responsibility of the party rank and file.

The preparation of the document was begun by a decision of the Central Committee in the middle of last January when about 20 experts were asked to comment on preliminary document themes. They were also discussed in the Central Committee's sections, on the basis of which the first draft was compiled and analyzed in the Central Committee and published in the beginning of April.

Dozens of experts were consulted, and a broad party and organizational debate was conducted before the writing of the second draft. Hakanen and Nieminen, the secretaries of the document work group, also talked with Soviet experts in Moscow and familiarized themselves with the most recent materials of the fraternal party.

When the third draft was written for the congress, more than 140 different statements and a couple thousand specific proposals for changes had been received. The document was debated in at least 300 meetings and events.

At the congress itself, the issue was debated intensively in the assembly hall as well as in the committees. Finally, the result was a 10-page list of changes, in accordance with which the congress of the SKP(Unity) adopted the political document. It contains the directions and future goals of the political activity of Communists.

"The debate was undeniably serious, but gratifyingly animated," evaluated Hannu Nieminen.

According to him, it was important that a responsible and critical approach was taken toward the issue. The document was not accepted as a self-evident party office product, but it was felt to be a personal issue, in which there was a desire to have an influence and make improvements.

"In my opinion, the debate demonstrated the desire and readiness of the party rank and file to discuss even major issues. Questions of new thinking, revolution, and socialism in today's Finland were now raised in a new manner. The issues had to be treated from the point of view of our philosophical arguments. This is a direct reference to the program debate, which will continue into the next congress.

"The document which defines our policy line was understood as a common issue, whose debate positively supported the development of a common consciousness. This is the most important and encouraging aspect of this issue," emphasizes Hannu Nieminen.

He considers that the debate also produced a couple definite problems.

"One is connected with the fact that it was expected that this document would in one fell swoop bridge the gap which prevails between Marxist research isolated from party practice and our practical political work, which is often felt to be very pragmatic. This is, however, a more long-range task.

"In my opinion, the gap exists and it must be closed. A positive start has been made in this matter in my opinion.

"The other problem is connected with the demands for clear operational guidelines. In many ways the new situation and new thinking, however, require a broader situational analysis and an accomplishment of the tasks based on it as a common cause of the entire membership. Therefore, we cannot just be satisfied with simple operational guidelines.

"In my view everyone must accept responsibility for the formulation of the party line also, and not just its mechanical accomplishment. This is the key to common awareness and to raising the level of common action," stated Hannu Nieminen concisely after submitting the final changes which were approved for the political document by a decision of the congress.

#### Congress Stands Viewed

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 10 Jun 87 p 3

[Commentary by Urho Jokinen: "A Tough Meeting"]

[Text] Perestroika [reform] does not mean that everything must be applied with a patina of approval, especially every form of criticism. It is also not a question of sacred matters or areas in front of which a white flag should be raised, but also not a question of there not being any issues at all which should be given great respect.

The 21st Congress of the SKP(Unity) and the debate preceding it in TIEDONANTAJA were at a high and growing political level. Presumably, one would be closer to reality in an assessment if it were to be said that they reflected reality and the phase of political development rather well. Thus also the incompleteness of events and the considerable fluctuation of knowledge and awareness caused in part by it. The debate also contained views poorly suited to or directed at reality, and such should, naturally, be eliminated. If we are to talk about the congress, there was also rhetoric, as Esa Ylikoski would say (one of TIEDONANTAJA's debaters).

Those worthy of Esa's labelling could be found among those delivering speeches at the congress. But before this label is used with all its force, it should be noted that the same speeches also contained an issue for the presentation of which the rhetorical method was used. Only the circumstance of how the speech corresponds with the deeds in question justifies one to conclude what kind of a presentation was in question, if there is now even a

need, in general, to discuss such things. The ease as well as the difficulty of mere speech are absolute truths.

Otherwise, praising the speech of TIEDONANTAJA's debate, as I have done, cannot, of course, or must not refute the right of criticism directed at parts of the debate. Criticism and self-criticism should be used with slightly more thought while, nevertheless, increasing the amount. Now criticism is what is directed elsewhere and frequently acquires a form directed at a rather specific issue, organization, or individual. But when it is a question of self-criticism, the limit of specificity stops far from oneself; there is talk about "us", "in our organizations", "there is too much in our midst", and so on while all the way to the end carefully and nonspecifically avoiding a definite subject/object.

As far as rhetoric is concerned, eloquence and rhetoric emphasizing this kind of group work, for example, which proceeds from the decisive position of basic organizational work are always justified. Without this self-directed premise, talk about group work is frequently a diversion of some circumstance, issue, or point of view.

It would be worth our while to reduce words and increase deeds as far as perestroyka is concerned. Making the issue as specific as possible would not be a bad thing, which is an important requirement of perestroyka.

Among the high-level speeches delivered at the congress, there were several in which capitalism was disclosed in a manner that was to the point. Capitalism should be relentlessly accused. In disclosing capitalism, progress is made toward a final disclosure at the same time that a final disclosure draws ever further away: the ingenuity of capitalists in the development of forms of exploitation and oppression is limitless. It will not be exhausted or end until the system is changed.

The fundamental idea of capitalism is known to everyone, at least in some way, or it is known that the so-called free interest of the individual is the profit seeking interest of individual large corporations. In this sense there is no social entity. This issue is made very clear in the political document of the congress, but the document is really only a beginning in the analysis of the present situation.

The reform that has been started in the USSR has made some people dumbfounded. For example, the election reform may be difficult for some to understand. It is thought that previously the situation was such that "the nomination of candidates was dictated from above", but that now it is different. Naturally, this is not the question in the election experiment with several candidates. Otherwise, the meaning of the USSR and socialism was brought out exceptionally well at the congress.

What then can be generally said about the congress? For example, that it did not take the path of adventurism, but retained contacts with thousands of "Cultural House Communist members", extensive independent operational opportunities and its politically achieved advantageous position. If the congress

had been completely unanimous, the bourgeois press would have said that it had been railroaded. Now that there were differing views, it was a quarrelsome "95-percent unanimity", the prospects are not weighted down by anything.

#### Presidential Campaign Affected Congress

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 10 Jun 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Unnecessary Confusion in Candidate Issue"]

[Text] Without a doubt, there have been many deficiencies in the organization field belonging to the Democratic Alternative in the democratic debate of the presidential issue. But it is also a question of the fact that in spite of the specific decisions and many meetings of Deva [Democratic Alternative] and the leadership organs of its organizations behind the scenes, which have considered the issue, information has not been disseminated and the issue has not actually been debated at the basic level.

This has resulted in an unnecessary confusion, which was also apparent in several of the speeches at the 21st Congress of the SKP(Unity). Individuals who have long since declined were proposed as Deva's presidential candidates.

Support for Kalevi Kivistö was proposed even though the SKDL's leadership has rejected any and all cooperation with Deva and even though one could join Kivistö's election alliance only as an individual member of Deva. Deva as Deva would have to be excluded from the elections and disregard the decision of the Turku negotiations meeting, according to which Deva will participate as an independent force in the presidential elections.

A continuation of the debate of the candidacy question after 13 June is being proposed even though actual election work should be started immediately.

The qualifications demanded of Deva's own candidates and the qualifications of Governor Kivistö continue to be mutually confused even though the above-mentioned individuals should be discussed first.

Kivistö's foreign policy credentials are not such that he could be placed in the forefront as Deva's own candidate, especially since this would mean Deva's exclusion from the elections. In many essential foreign policy questions, Kivistö does not represent any kind of alternative, for example, that is exceptional to the advantage of President Mauno Koivisto. As far as domestic policy is concerned, he is a typical consensus man.

In this situation it is a waste of time to bring up that circumstance that some of the people now working in Deva were behind Kivistö 6 years ago. They were then a part of the SKDL and to a man voted for their own candidate. During the nomination phase, they, indeed, would have wanted another candidate. Even many members of the SKP leadership got to read about Kivistö's nomination in the newspaper. That was the kind of democratic procedure at that time.

Movement's Critics In Press Attacked

Helsinki TIEDONANTAJA in Finnish 10 Jun 87 p 2

[Commentary by 'Aleksandrovits': "Quarreling Taistoites"]

[Text] If anyone has in the meanwhile managed to forget whom the right wing and the consensus front consider to be the primary political opponent, one would think the events of recent days would refresh one's memory. It is self-evident that the SKP(Unity) and Deva are considered to be the primary political opponents.

And even though there is delight over the vanishing support of this primary opponent, no one, on the other hand, believes it will wither away.

Otherwise, why would there be a need for such a combination of obscuring of the truth, deliberate distortions, and malice, to which the dominant organs of the press resorted in "reporting" on the 21st Congress of the SKP(Unity)?

Tuesday's editorial in HELSINGIN SANOMAT is a model example of the distorted truth tactics of the right wing. The editorial contained a large number of false statements, but not one of them is the result of a lack of knowledge but only demonstrates the writer's vast anti-communist expertise.

The article exaggerates the few discordant voices at the congress into a ground swell and gives us to understand that the "quarreling Taistoites" are now divided into three lines and factions.

There is an affected ingratiation of those who are of a differing opinion and they are labelled "radicals", on the one hand, and the only "sincere" supporters of Soviet reform and SKP unity, on the other hand.

Naturally, the comrades mentioned have not given permission to HELSINGIN SANOMAT for such praise. But it still holds true that when the bourgeoisie praises you, it does so for the purpose of disruption, and there is reason to examine the validity of one's own position.

As a counterpoint to those being praised, the main group of "Taistoites" supposedly "continues to live in their own isolated world" and "the new winds coming from the CPSU are not apparent in their actions".

And, naturally, these "Taistoites" are also to be blamed for the division in the SKP and left-wing forces. Thus the editorial once again in passing absolves Aalto's faction of any guilt.

The editorial in HELSINGIN SANOMAT as well as the falsehood attributed to Taisto Sinisalo in Monday's "news" represent such a fine-tuned disruption of the SKP(Unity), Deva, and the leftist intelligentsia and criticism of the SKDL's leadership that one cannot almost help but admire it.

The behavior of such an opponent as well as the personal slander directed against Jouko Kajanoja in the bourgeois and Social Democratic newspapers make this columnist, at least, more convinced of the fact that Deva should participate in the presidential elections and nominate its own candidate.

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## MITTERRAND APPRAISED AT PEAK OF CAREER

Paris L'EVENEMENT DU JEUDI in French 2-8 Jul 87 p 8

[Article by Andre Chambraud: "Why Is Mitterrand So Popular?"]

[Text] Francois Mitterrand is 70 years old. He began in politics in 1944 as general secretary for prisoners of war of a government headed by General de Gaulle. Throughout his 43-year-long career, he has more often known the people's disfavor than the adulation of the crowds. And while he has succeeded on his own in rebuilding the Socialist Party, it took him three tries before he was finally elected president, mainly thanks to the Giscard-Chirac rivalry. Throughout the first 2 years of his 7-year term, he followed a risky economic policy that he finally had to resign himself to modifying on the urgent advice of some of his ministers. From May 1983 to January 1986, he was the most unpopular of all the presidents of the Fifth Republic. Nor did he regain the favor of the French until the March 1986 elections forced him to let Chirac govern.

And yet, today, that man who was so controversial and sometimes so hated, that man with the diminished powers is shown by the polls to be the big favorite in the 1988 presidential elections! According to the EXPRESS-Louis Harris survey, he would easily beat Barre (55 to 45 percent) and would crush Chirac (57 to 43 percent). Naturally, nothing guarantees that Mitterrand will run and that, if such is the case, will be reelected. But whatever the future may bring, his current performance is nevertheless extraordinary, so extraordinary that his rivals have practically come to the conclusion that there is something diabolical about the man.

Diabolical? Well, at least a sleight-of-hand artist. More fundamentally, however, Mitterrand seems to me to be enjoying the rare good fortune of being perfectly in sync with his country. It is true that the right, by virtue of its conduct in power, has helped him a great deal. Chirac unwisely wagered everything on his economic policy, without realizing that whatever its merits, it could not have immediate effects. Consequently, his worried and divided majority, far from preaching optimism, wallows in depression and constantly lectures the French, who suddenly learn that they are a bunch of lazy incompetents, dependent individuals clinging to their Social Security like Moliere's Miser hanging on to his moneybox. If that majority had a new leader at its head, such remarks would perhaps be tolerated. But Chirac and

Barre are old prime ministers viewed by public opinion as responsible, along with others, for France's economic debacles of the past 15 years. Consequently, in the eyes of many, they embody a brutal restoration rather than a modernized liberalism.

Mitterrand naturally quickly understood what he could derive from the situation: He would represent modernity.

Initially, he took great care to mark out his territory in a coexistence to which he had become resigned only with great apprehension. After all, he would merely have had to make two or three blunders (or Chirac would have maneuvered more shrewdly) in order suddenly to appear as a discredited, humiliated president without convictions, swallowing insult upon insult while painting everything roses.

Since this did not occur, he was quite easily able to devote himself to his great plan: at last, embodying France and the French. This is the paradox that most infuriates his adversaries: His controversial past has for him become the most precious of his assets.

Mitterrand had once more or less believed in the virtues of socialism, the merits of nationalizations, the possibility of a grand social policy, the revival of the economy through consumption, the eminent role of the state. The French had believed in them also, and not without some justification. It is too often forgotten that during the "30 glorious years," the government was one of the most powerful driving forces of expansion and it constantly encouraged a certain socialization of the country.

Likewise, Mitterrand had flirted with the communists before at last administering the kiss of death, for which the French remain profoundly grateful. This is why, when the Mitterrand of 1987 goes from village to village singing the praises of a human socialism, an economic development that cannot come about without or against wage earners, a united France in which the little people will not be abandoned, the French listen to him all the more attentively because the great majority of them have driven the same road as the president: Once somewhat socialistic, they now grant liberalism some virtues, provided it does not require them to give up all their social gains.

Thus it is that, facing a Chirac perceived as too exclusively political and a Barre seen as too exclusively involved in economics, Mitterrand seems to deliver a message that is a blend of wisdom, humanity and understanding, one that reassures a country now ready to evolve, but not raped! Under the circumstances, even his age becomes an advantage: A patriarch has ambitions for others, not for himself, right? He therefore appears to be more attentive to the expectations of the French, more in tune with his time, more modern than his rivals.

Is Mitterrand taking advantage of that state of grace to make his farewell tour, to greet the crowds before leaving? Or to prepare for his reelection? Inasmuch as he knows only too well that one can never hang on too long to

the father-of-his-country role, he will probably run only if he feels capable of one last metamorphosis, one leading him to define, at last, a policy, objectives, a method, rather than merely expressing a philosophy or feelings. Barre and Chirac are already attacking him for his vagueness and he will have to respond soon. For posterity. Or for his reelection.

11,464  
CSO: 3519/152

## EDITORIAL CONSIDERS EUROPEAN DETERRENCE PROBLEMS

Paris LE NOUVEL ECONOMISTE in French No 600, 10 Jul 87 p 41

[Article by Jean-Pierre Chevenement: "Time To Grow Up"]

[Text] To expect the United States to close the door on Gorbachev's proposals, as certain European governments would have it do, is quite simply to ignore the facts. Insofar as they do not assume the responsibility for their own defense, the peoples of Europe must accept scenarios that respond first of all to the interests of those who "protect" them. There is something indecent about these cries of abandoned children! It is time to grow up!

Nor is European public opinion necessarily right to rejoice over the so-called "double zero" option. People have undoubtedly perceived that in "Euromissiles," the prefix "Euro-" first of all designates the target! But they forget the presence in the heart of Europe of an entire very short-range nuclear artillery whose function it would be to set off the cataclysm in German territory. They forget that disarmament must give priority to strategic weapons, then conventional and chemical weapons, in which field Soviet superiority, although exaggerated, is nevertheless scarcely to be doubted.

For my part, I do not believe it is possible to reach a purely conventional balance between little West Europe and the Soviet superpower. The length of its borders, the proximity to China and the situation in Central Asia, without mentioning that of East Europe, will always lead the Soviet Union to maintain a conventional potential disproportionate to that of the nations of the West, some of which have already done away with military service. The security of West Europe will long depend on the existence of a nuclear deterrent based on the so-called "from-the-weakest-to-the-strongest" model. The great interest of the double zero option is that it forces Europeans to look reality in the face and take responsibility for their own defense.

Convincing public opinion in Europe will take time, if only because of outside reticence--of the Soviet Union, but the United States as well--and especially because of internal opposition and discord. Disagreements between Europeans cannot involve the aim of a common defense, but only the means. Europe's interest can only be the preservation of peace on our continent. In other words, the concept of "battle" in Europe, while it can be conceived of in American or Soviet doctrine, must be radically excluded from a European defense doctrine. Only deterrence, which makes peace dependent upon a balance between the East and the West on our continent and authorizes the necessary rapprochements, can work for all of Europe.

Turning then to the means, how are we to build a European deterrent? To what extent can one speak of conventional deterrence without distorting the very meaning of the concept of deterrence and thus coming back to a concept of battle? What should the role of nuclear weapons be in a concept of an autonomous European defense? Can one develop cooperation between the French and British strategic forces? If one wishes to build, in order to protect oneself from an accident or an irrational move, a "graduated" deterrence, is it possible to introduce the notion of a "final warning" into European doctrine and in what form? In other words, in the nuclear panoply of "prestrategic" weapons, can one define doctrines on their use together?

Defense and the economy are obviously linked, just as the individual responsibilities of France and Germany are. Between the two countries, one has the terms of a balanced, dynamic dialogue. Germany and France must achieve a veritable qualitative leap in their relations. In order to ward off the decline that lies in wait for both of them, they have to reach a common vision of their future.

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**PARTIES' NARROW APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY CRITICIZED**

Paris L'EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL in French 24 Jul 87 p 34

[Article by Alain Besancon: "What Strategic Policy?"]

[Text] Within days of each other, Raymond Barre, Jacques Chirac and Michel Rocard revealed their foreign policy (LE MONDE, 7, 8 and 11 July). Chirac is in the government, Barre in the (moderate) majority opposition and Rocard in the (moderate) opposition opposition. Despite the difference in their situations, one can observe agreement in their opinions, further accentuated by the care the three men took (undoubtedly aided by their diplomatic advisers) in polishing their remarks and toning down any sharp points. Through the three statements, it is definitely France's foreign policy that is expressed, the famous consensus which, despite nuances added by each one, renders cohabitation possible. In his "Reflections on France's Foreign Policy," published in 1986, Francois Mitterrand developed highly similar views.

Let us consult the three texts to see what they can tell us about the main theaters of our foreign policy.

The most important one, relations with Gorbachev's USSR, is where analysis is the most uncertain. "I hope that Gorbachev wins," Chirac states. He considers him to be a competent modernizer encountering the conservative resistance of the "old men." Gorbachev's fight therefore resembles that of Pompidou, who wanted to bring France into the industrial age, and of Chirac himself. Statesmen in democracies tend to attribute to communist leaders their own concerns and plans. Rocard does not believe that "we have the right to act as if the new general secretary were exclusively a hypocritical speechifier." Nevertheless, he emphasizes that we must in no instance "let down our guard," which shows that on Gorbachev, he has not made up his mind either. Barre abstains on this point.

All three claim to be Europeans. Chirac explicitly keeps his distance from the Gaullist heritage. He is scarcely far from Rocard with respect to European solidarity and construction, still encumbered by reticence and hesitation, a plausible European defense. Of the three, Barre is the most specific, the only one who clearly asks for a European confederation or policy union, sealed by a monetary union. This is realistic because if there is a European currency, many of the competencies of the national governments will be transferred *ipso facto* to the European level.

Rocard enthusiastically hails the disarmament prospects he thinks he glimpses. More warmly than Chirac, he approves of the zero and double zero options, which Barre, for his part, rejects.

Concerning the attitude to take vis-a-vis the United States, our three statesmen abstain from the acerbic criticisms and arrogant gestures of which France had made a habit. They all weep over the Third World and the tragic fate of Africa. Rocard and Chirac are cautious about the Middle East, supporting an international conference with the participation of the USSR and China, while wary of meddling in Israeli domestic affairs. In this area, as in Iran, South Africa and Afghanistan, all three recognize the limits of France's action.

What general impression is left by the three statements? That of a certain hollowness, a certain emptiness. It does not stem from the personality of the three statesmen, who demonstrate good will, common sense and a modesty in contrast with the grand airs of the time of Couve de Murville and Claude Cheysson. Rather, it derives from the general evolution of Europe.

We had followed a foreign policy of the government-to-government type, whose purpose was the interests of the French Government. However, we now face problems that go beyond that traditional framework. When Barre refers to the great demographic rearrangement of the globe and when Rocard worries about the energy shortage and pollution in the world, they are sincere. The Quai d'Orsay is not equipped to face the international communist movement or the Islamic thrust. Furthermore, the nation-state is no longer an autonomous monad. It does not have the critical mass. For example, France can do nothing about the domestic caprices of the American democracy. It belongs to an economic, commercial, monetary and partially military unit, control of which is beyond its grasp. Our old nations of Europe have all reached the same point, which is why we are so passive about the Middle East and why, confronting the USSR, we are incapable of taking the initiative. We slowly get together about the best way to respond to an action constantly imposed on us. The nation-state is outdated, but Europe, which our three presidential candidates would like to see stronger and more united, no longer truly exists. And, since it does not exist, the government hangs on to its prerogative and jealously clings to its right of veto on every policy it does not like, which further impedes the constitution of any European will. Thus it is that Europe in general and France in particular seem doomed to impotence and provincialism. At least one would hope that the monopoly which the government retains over its foreign policy and which it uses less to act than to prevent others from acting, will not be exalted under the faded, frayed but still unanimously wielded banner of "national independence."

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CSO: 3519/152

## REPORTED SOVIET OIL PRODUCTION IN BARENTS SEA COMPLICATES TIES

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Aug 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Important Oil Find"]

[Text] The first tons of oil from the continental shelf in the Barents Sea have already been produced--by the Soviet Union. This surprising piece of information from the party organ PRAVDA has created a new dimension in Norway's biggest unsolved foreign-policy problem, the partition of the continental shelf in the Barents Sea.

The profitable Soviet oil find was made scarcely a month ago, and the field has already been brought into production. It lies in undisputed Soviet territory and therefore does not directly affect the conflict between Norway and the Soviet Union over who has the right to make use of 155,000 square kilometers of sea and seafloor in the north. But this oil find--and the rapid rate of its development--will nevertheless have an impact on the discussions.

The discovery has proven what geologists and other oil experts had assumed. Under the Barents Sea lie enormous resources and riches the ownership of which, because of the long-standing dispute between Norway and the Soviet Union over the line of partition, no one has been able to establish.

The Soviet oil find could complicate the discussions which have taken place since 1974 and which have been unsuccessful so far. If, because of the oil find, Moscow sticks uncompromisingly to its demand, the Barents Sea problem could continue to grow during the time it takes to come up with a solution.

This does not mean that Norway must act precipitately or agree to solutions which are unacceptable with reference to both international law and our own interests. But it is high time to start seeing some progress in the discussions. That may happen when Prime Minister Nikolai Rysjkov pays an official visit in January, especially since Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland has asked that this problem be placed on the agenda for the visit.

Norway long ago indicated its willingness to compromise on the issue of the partition line, without its having been met thus far by a corresponding Soviet declaration of intent. If some progress now took place in the Barents Sea discussions, that would be proof Moscow really means something by its statement that relations with Norway are going to improve. It is now up to the Soviet Union to take the initiative.

## VOTE SHIFTS, ABSTENTION, PATTERNS IN PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

## Inter-Party Movement Detailed

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 25 Jul 87 pp 36R-38R

[Text] The resounding victory by the PSD [Social Democratic Party] as reflected in its gain of over 1.1 million votes confirms that party's movement along a path of increasing growth (it had already picked up 190,000 new voters in 1985) that has lifted it firmly into its position as the party with the most votes.

Its favorable results appear on all fronts. It took more than 10,000 votes from the CDU/APU [CDU/United People's Alliance]--a modest figure but an important one, since it reveals for the first time a direct transfer in significant numbers between politically antagonistic parties. Over 190,000 votes were taken from the PS [Socialist Party], a party from which the PSD had previously taken about 155,000 votes in 1985. And from the PRD [Democratic Renewal Party], it not only won back the approximately 130,000 votes lost in 1985 but also managed to pick up 270,000 new voters.

From the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], it captured nearly 260,000 votes on top of the 60,000 it had already won in 1985. It recovered more than 170,000 voters from the abstentionists and was the only party to achieve such a feat in these elections, thus more than regaining the nearly 15,000 it had lost in 1985. Lastly, it attracted 24,000 votes from among the small parties and among new voters.

As can be seen on the map showing changes for the PSD, its rise was general throughout the country but was much more pronounced in the North, proving that the PSD had not reached the saturation point in the area it dominates, since it revealed its greater power to attract even there.

It can even be said that as a result of last Sunday's balloting, the northern part of the country has stabilized as a bastion of undisputed PSD domination, with its counterpoint in Alentejo, where the APU still has the nucleus of its voter forces.


### Most Abstentions on Left

In these elections, abstention lost its position as "Portugal's largest party" by dropping to second place with 2,120,000 "votes," even though its numbers were increased by more than 240,000 additional voters.

With the above-mentioned exception of the PSD, which succeeded in motivating about 170,000 abstentionists, all the parties lost supporters to the abstention group, thus increasing the number of nonvoters by 415,000. The PRD contributed the greatest number (145,000, or 35 percent of the total). It was followed by the CDU, which lost 130,000 (31 percent), the CDS with nearly 60,000 (14 percent), new voters with over 30,000 (8 percent), the PS with under 30,000 (6 percent), and the small parties with 25,000 (6 percent).

The map showing changes in abstention rates by municipality reveals that the increases were concentrated regionally in the South. As had also been true in the second round of balloting in the presidential election, the tendency to stay away from the polls was stronger among the Left's voters and in the areas where it is dominant. Discouraged by the thought of a victory which they already knew would not be theirs, leftist voters throughout the South and in a few scattered industrial municipalities in the Center and North made it possible by their absence for the inevitable Social Democratic victory to increase its percentage.

The opposite behavior was noted among the inhabitants of the North, who went to the polls in numbers that actually caused a drop in the general abstention rate. It was clearly a movement motivated by the desire to vote for Cavaco Silva, whose results in the North and Center were overwhelming.



## PS Regains 180,000 Votes From PRD

After losing 850,000 votes in 1985, the PS has now managed a timid and very incomplete recovery of 60,000 voters. And that increase is the net result of two contradictory movements.

The Socialists recovered only about 180,000 of the huge number of voters siphoned off by Ramalho Eanes' party in '85. On the other hand, they took back 75,000 voters from the CDU and picked up 30,000 new votes from the small parties and among first-time voters.

But at the same time, the PS was also unable to resist completely the flood of voters rallying to the PSD. Although its net result after last Sunday's vote count was favorable, the PS had allowed nearly 200,000 voters to escape to Cavaco Silva and about 30,000 to take refuge in abstention (that 30,000 being offset by newly registered voters who voted for the PS for the first time).

The map showing the shift in the vote for the PS is the only one revealing contrasting behavior within the regions. The party's showing improved in its traditional areas (where the PRD had established itself more firmly 2 years earlier): the Tagus Valley, Coimbra, the Porto area, and the windward side of Alentejo. Those gains (shown in yellow and orange on the [original] map) show that the PS picked up the bulk of the voters returning from the PRD in those areas and that it did so in sufficient numbers to conceal probable losses--even in those areas--to the Social Democrats.

But the blue area on the map is the largest. It covers almost the entire country. The biggest losses occurred in the area traditionally dominated by the PSD/CDS.

## CDU Vote Confirms Communist Decline

The CDU lost nearly 210,000 votes in these elections--that on top of the 130,000 lost by the APU in 1985. The vote for the coalition headed by the PCP therefore confirms the trend toward a sharp decline that began, oddly enough, with the birth of the PRD. In fact, these legislative elections marked the worst voting results for the Communists since 25 April [1974]. The only other time they made such a poor showing was in the first elections of 1975--for the Constituent Assembly--when they obtained 12.5 percent of the vote.

The CDU's decline also reflects contradictory movements, but here the gains are quite modest. The PRD provided just over 20,000 votes--about 10 percent of what the APU had lost to the PRD in 1985. And probably only about 10,000 first-time voters put their "x" in front of the three CDU boxes on the ballot.

Losses, on the other hand, were large. They totaled 240,000 votes and were distributed about equally between abstention (125,000) on the one hand and Vitor Constancio (75,000) and the small parties on the other. The 26,000 votes lost to the small parties included a sizable share of the small vote which the MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission] managed to attract as it resumed its participation in elections.

Although the CDU's losses in its Alentejo stronghold were numerically significant, and although the permeability of its borders is being revealed once again and even more completely, the map of shifts in the Communist vote clearly shows that the CDU's greatest relative losses occurred in the North. Incidentally, the CDU map is almost the reverse of the PSD map.

The CDU even lost its position as largest party over wide areas of the Evora and Portalegre Districts and in such symbolic municipalities as Vila Real de Santo Antonio or the historic municipality of Marinha Grande.

#### PRD: Defeat on the Scale of its 1985 Victory

As was predicted by preelection analyses and forecasts, the PRD's voters from 1985 were split up among the other forces in the political spectrum. The PRD's fickle voters had already shown signs of their tendency to scatter (in the local elections of 1985 and the presidential election of 1986), and this time they forsook en masse the party to which they had given such a resplendent start in the legislative elections of 6 October.

In his recent role as party leader, Ramalho Eanes has experienced defeat on a scale approaching that of his unexpected success (18 percent) in 1985. The PRD wound up with the votes of less than one-third of those voters, being unable to hold back the loss of 400,000 voters to Cavaco Silva's party and of 200,000 to either the PS or the CDU. Moreover, 150,000 voters who had voted for the PRD about 2 years ago abstained from voting this time, while another 20,000 voted for the small parties. The net result of all those shifts was that in no case was there a positive flow into the PRD.

Naturally, given the political leanings of the voters it lost (over half of them to the PSD), the PRD's social base of support has now shifted more to the left, with a larger percentage of former APU voters, a considerably smaller component of voters originally from the PS, and the total disappearance of the sector further to the right, which votes only on special occasions.

It should be emphasized that the PRD has disappeared completely from the list of winning parties, having lost the primacy it enjoyed in 21 of the country's municipalities as a result of previous elections.

#### CDS: New Small Party

The CDS is another party that is declining rapidly. It lost 315,000 votes after previously losing nearly 140,000 in the 1985 elections. And although its decline has now speeded up considerably and reduced the CDS to the size of a small party of no political importance, the losing trend is the same as it has been in previous elections.

In 1985 the centrists could not prevent 160,000 voters from deserting them to vote for the PSD or abstain, and they also lost nearly 10,000 to the other parties. The direction being taken by its fleeing voters was confirmed in 1987, with over 300,000 deserting it to swell the ranks of the PSD or abstain and about 5,000 going over to other political groups.


The CDS, too, was relatively more successful in staving off ruin in the South than it was in the North. Its map of voting changes shows that the greater resistance in the South to the PSD and Cavaco is indeed a regional phenomenon and not merely a result of the fact that votes for the leftist parties are concentrated more heavily in that region of the country.

#### Urban Left, Rural Right


A breakdown of each party's urban and rural components shows that the traditional division between urban Left and rural Right has reestablished itself. The PS, whose makeup turned mostly rural with the mass defection of urban voters to the PRD in 1985, is now back in the group of parties whose greatest base of support is in the cities.

Abstention in the cities increased, and this is in line with the observation that it was the leftist parties which suffered most from the rise in the number of nonvoters.

But while the division between urban and rural votes shows that traditional equilibriums are holding steady, the weight of each party underwent changes on 19 July which, in their importance, go far beyond the value and implications of that geographic distribution.




Voting Changes Between 1985 and 1987



Voting Changes Between 1985 and 1987  
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
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### Each Party's Transfers

Net transfers among all the parties and to and from abstention totaled about 1.8 million votes. The transfers illustrated graphically below show only the net gains or losses between each two parties, with the movement being shown in only one direction (for example, some PS voters who voted for the CDS are not shown because the flow of CDS voters to the PS was larger, and the net result of movement in both directions was 75,000 voters supporting the Socialists). The actual number of Portuguese shifting their vote totaled about 2 million. That extremely huge mass of floating voters has caused Portuguese election results to shift on a scale unexpected and unheard of in most European democracies. It was those floating voters who were responsible for the sudden rise of the PRD and the crashing collapse of the PS in 1985, and it is they who have now given the PSD a historic election result involving an increase of 1.1 million votes in less than 2 years. That result has also placed the PRD and the CDS in the category of small parties and noticeably harmed the traditional cohesion of the communist bloc. The extreme fickleness exhibited by Portuguese voters leaves open the possibility that in future elections, there will again be important transfers of votes which will either strengthen or confuse the current party panorama.

Each Party's Transfers  
(in thousands)





**Each Party's Transfers (continued)**  
(in thousands)




(PS)



(CDS)




(CDU)




Each Party's Transfers (continued)  
(in thousands)



(PRD)



Abstention



## Evolution of Right, Left

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 25 Jul 87 p 11

[Excerpt] For purposes of analysis, it is useful to recall how voting on the left and on the right has evolved over the past 12 years in nine nationwide elections.

That is what we are presenting in the table below.

Election	PSD + CDS	PS + PCP + MDP - PRD	Abstention
1975 Constituent	1 942 161 <b>34.0%</b>	3 131 939 <b>53.9%</b>	8.3%
1976 Assembly	2 214 191 <b>40.4%</b>	2 698 470 <b>49.2%</b>	13.4%
1979 Assembly	2 719 211 <b>45.3%</b>	2 771 458 <b>46.1%</b>	12.9%
1980 Assembly	2 868 017 <b>47.5%</b>	2 682 784 <b>44.6%</b>	16.1%
1982 President	2 325 481 <b>39.8%</b>	3 262 784 <b>55.9%</b>	15.6%
1982 Assembly	2 271 809 <b>39.8%</b>	3 092 918 <b>54.2%</b>	22.2%
1983 Assembly	2 341 488 <b>39.9%</b>	3 141 488 <b>54.2%</b>	27.7%
1986 President	2 862 728 <b>49.2%</b>	3 105 750 <b>50.8%</b>	21.8%
1986 Assembly	3 165 120 <b>54.5%</b>	2 251 093 <b>40.0%</b>	27.4%

The first thing to note is that the Right has grown from fewer than 2 million voters in 1975 (34 percent of the ballots validly cast) to over 3 million and its peak of 54.5 percent in 1987. That growth has not been constant: after its takeoff in 5 October 1980, when it became the majority for the first time, not only in the Assembly of the Republic but also in number of votes, the Right dropped to the threshold of 40 percent 2 months later in the election won by Soares Carneiro and stayed there until the start of Freitas do Amaral's campaign. Now all the leftist parties combined stand at 40 percent.

But statistically speaking, this is only the second time that the Left has been in the minority. Out of nine nationwide elections, the Left has won seven and lost two.

In general, the rise in abstention seems to be harming the Left most. The Left has achieved its best results when the abstention rate has been low: in the elections for the Constituent Assembly in 1975 and in the confrontation between Eanes and Soares Carneiro in 1980. But it is also true that the

Left's best result--54.2 percent--was achieved precisely 2 years ago. Miguel Galvao Teles is probably right when he says that the PRD's chief mistake was to let the Cavaco Silva government take power. In 1985, the opposition turned down the opportunity to be in the government. In 1987, it reaped the result.

#### Abstention, Vote Patterns

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 24 Jul 87 pp 20-21

[Article by Francisco Soares; italics indicated by slantlines]

[Text] In an article which appeared in this newspaper and in which we commented on the 1983 election results, we warned of the danger of superficial or hasty analyses which, on the basis of the large vote received by the PS in that election (36.1 percent), might conceal the real challenges facing the Left and, in particular, the Socialists.

It was also said there that a "transfer" toward the right was detectable in the party spectrum centered on the PS and the PSD, and it was that circumstance, incidentally, which provided the article's headline: "Are Votes Moving to the Left and Voters to the Right?"

It was also said that the situation could be changed only if the PS paid more attention to its left wing by clearly asserting itself as a major left-wing party with a plan for change.

But that was not what happened. Instead, there was the experiment with the "central bloc" and the election disaster of 6 October 1985. The consequences, as is now being seen, have been lasting. The appearance of the PRD and now its near annihilation have constituted only a transitory phenomenon, and they ought not to deceive anyone concerning the erosion caused by that experiment and style of government.

But equally hasty analyses are now being presented to explain last Sunday's election results and, in particular, the unexpected and historic vote for the PSD. In simplistic fashion, it is being said that the PSD's 50 percent consisted of the 30 percent it already had plus the 13 percent lost by the PRD, the 5.5 percent "stolen" from the CDS, and 1.5 percent that presumably came from the APU.

We feel that the reality is a little more complex, and here we will attempt a trial analysis of the shift in the voting pattern, both overall and on the basis of the voting figures, that will help us interpret more clearly the meaning of the percentage changes which have occurred.

#### 1. "Abstention" Party

Although unable to follow established methods which are the subject of an extensive literature and which are used in other countries, we are offering here--on the basis of inquiries and polls leading to models making it possible to ascertain voter flow among the various parties, /including abstention/--a

Table 1: Voter Changes and Voting Shifts, 1985-1987  
(1,000's of votes)

Party (1)	1985 (2)	"Potential" 1987 (a) (3)	1987 (4)	Differ- ence 5=(4)-(3)	Corrected diff.(b) (6)	$\frac{7}{(6)} \cdot (3)$
PSD	1 711	1 739	2 821	+ 1 082	+ 772	(+ 44.4%)
PS	1 196	1 215	1 255	+ 40	+ 145	(+ 11.9%)
CDU(APU)	893	908	685	- 223	- 13	(- 1.4%)
PRD	1 036	1 053	278	- 775	- 594	(- 56.4%)
CDS	560	569	244	- 325	- 325	(- 57.1%)
Other Left	159	161	18	- 2	- 26	(+ 16.2%)
Other Right	40	40	31	- 9	- 9	(- 22.5%)

- (a) The 1985 vote plus 1.62 percent (increase in registered voters between 1985 and 1987).
- (b) Correction taking into account the model of votes transferred to and from abstention as described in the text.

simplified approximation based solely on the election results. In our opinion, it makes possible a clearer explanation of the magnitudes involved and of the voting shifts needing to be explained.

Assuming, for lack of better data, that the increase in the number of registered voters should be divided up in accordance with the percentages obtained previously by each party, we obtain the "potential" number of votes for each party in the elections of 19 July (see table 1, column 3). In other words, we take it as our basic hypothesis that each party will keep the voter base it had in 1985. We then add to that the corresponding percentage of the total increase in new voters and come up with the votes it should receive in 1987. Those votes are shown in column 3 of table 1. The difference between that figure and the number of votes actually received (column 5) tells us how much each party has gained or lost /in net figures/ with respect to the other parties and to abstention. According to this first approximation, the PSD won over 1 million votes more than its potential, while the PS picked up 40,000 and the three other big parties combined lost more than 1.3 million votes in comparison with their potential.

But from 1985 to 1987, the number of abstentions rose by about 242,000. Let us therefore attempt a theoretical distribution of abstention and its increase and use that to try to analyze how much the parties gained and lost /among themselves/.

We begin by assuming that the PSD's campaign efforts enabled it to attract the votes of about 16.5 percent of the former abstentionists—that is, 310,000 of the 1,877,000 who had not voted in 1985. This means that we still have to

explain about 500,000 abstentions in 1987 (the net difference between actual abstentions and the figure corresponding to a percentage equal to that in 1985, or about 200,000, plus the 310,000). We assume that those additional losses to abstention affected primarily the PRD and the CDU/APU (40 percent each) and, to a lesser extent, the PS (20 percent). On the basis of those assumptions (and analysis of the figures by district does not seem to contradict them on the whole), we come up with column 6 of table 1, which shows us the net gains and losses of the various parties /among themselves/.

We then see that the PSD probably gained about 772,000 votes from the other parties and that the PS gained 145,000 (in net figures). The PRD presumably lost nearly 600,000 votes to the other parties, excluding abstention, while the CDS presumably lost about 325,000.

Although other interpretations are possible, this one seems reasonably solid. Since someone might ask how, in that case, the CDU/APU had a /net/ loss of only 13,000 votes to the other parties, we will say right now that we continue to feel that--as is now coming to be recognized, incidentally--voters did not "jump the stream" in significant numbers (that is, there were no major shifts between noncontiguous areas of the political spectrum).

## 2. Transfers Among Parties

Having considered the movement to and from abstention, let us now look at the breakdown of net transfers among the parties (table 2).

Based on the hypotheses in table 2, the CDS lost 324,000 votes to the PSD (representing its entire loss in terms of the "potential" extrapolated from 1985).

The CDU/APU presumably regained about 1.5 percent of the PRD's previous 18 percent, but on the other hand, it lost about 32,000 votes to the MDP, another 32,000 to the PSD, and about 40,000 to the PS. It seems indefensible to assume a larger loss "across the stream" to the PSD, since that would lead to the assumption that it picked up more than 1.5 percent from the PRD, and that, in turn, would be the same as saying that the PRD vote in 1985 included a larger component of former APU voters than that 1.5 percent. On the other hand, and based on our hypothesis, about two-thirds of the APU's losses were due to abstention, the "purgatory" for voters in the process of change.

Of the PRD's losses in terms of its "potential," about 505,000 remain to be explained after 90,000 are "assigned" to the CDU. Assuming that about three-fifths went to the PSD and two-thirds to the PS, we can conclude that the PSD must have taken about 100,000 of the voters who voted for the PS in 1985.

On the other hand, the PS took 40,000 votes from the APU, as was mentioned above, about 200,000 from the PRD, and 7,000 from the small parties, thereby hanging on to about 83 percent of its "potential" vote in 1987.

If we read table 2 "by line" and "by column," we can see the figures which explain the essential voting changes discussed above. By line, there is one

Table 2: Voting Shifts, 1985-1987

(1,000's)

	1985 1987	PSD	PS	APU	PRD	CDS	Other Left	Other Right	Abst. +B+N	Votes 1987
PSD	1,739	106	32	307	321	—	9	310	2,821	
PS	—	1010	40	198	—	—	—	—	—	1,255
CDU	—	—	595	90	—	—	—	—	—	685
PRD	—	—	—	277	—	—	—	—	—	277
CDS	—	—	—	—	244	—	—	—	—	244
Other Left	—	—	32	—	—	155	—	—	—	187
Other Right	—	—	—	—	—	—	31	—	—	31
Abst. +B+N	—	105	209	181	—	—	—	—	1,749	2,244
"Potential" 1987 <sup>a</sup>	1,739	1,215	906	1,053	806	161	40	2,059	7,744	

(1) As defined in the text.

big winner, and that is obviously the PSD. It should be noted that according to our model, its gains were primarily at the expense of abstention, the CDS, and the PRD in almost equal proportions and, to a marginal extent, the PS. By column, we see that the big loser was the PRD, which lost mainly to the PSD, then to the PS and to abstention, and marginally to the CDU.

So there are the figures, and the only claim made is that they constitute a preliminary contribution to the possible interpretation of the vote transfers that have occurred. One thing seems certain: the Right apparently achieved a historic "plenum" last 19 July. Unlike the situation in the past, most of the temporary abstention now seems to consist of former voters "from the left" whose number totals about 500,000 (leading to the assumption that there are also about 1.5 million voters who abstain permanently). On the other hand, the PSD wound up with about 750,000 "borrowed" voters, and it surely will not be able to hang onto all of them on the left and on the right. It is now up to the CDS, or to some other party that replaces it, to speak up so as to counteract the "Mexicanization" of Portuguese democracy which will arise if, in upcoming elections, the PSD does not return to its "natural base" of support, which probably totals between 35 and 40 percent at present. From that standpoint, the PSD's 50 percent was in fact a surprise even to the PSD's leaders themselves.

## Patterns of Undecided Vote

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 25 Jul 87 p 2

[Text] More than 900,000 voters, or about 12.3 percent of all those registered, had not decided how to vote right up until Sunday 19 July itself, according to a new poll of the EXPRESSO-Euroexpansion Panel. The poll, which was conducted on Monday and Tuesday of this week, showed, however, that most undecided voters (nearly two-thirds) wound up not voting: they abstained.

Most of those who did vote chose the Social Democratic Party or the Socialist Party. As a matter of fact, if we consider only those who voted for the PS, we find that 8.3 percent did not make up their minds until they reached the door to the polling station.

Generally speaking, every party except the CDU had claimed at the start of the campaign that it would have the support of approximately three-fourths of its voters (PSD: 76 percent; PS: 73 percent; PRD: 78 percent; and CDS: 77 percent). The CDU was sure of only 62 percent of its voters.


If we make a more detailed analysis of how the election campaign affected voting intentions, we see that:

1. During the first 2 weeks of the campaign, the PSD and the CDU were practically the only ones to have pinned down a significant number of voters. In that race, the coalition that included the PCP was even ahead: of every 100 voters who had made up their minds at that time, the CDU had 32 compared to 30 for the PSD.
2. In the last week of the race, the PSD's strong concentration on a final crescendo seems to have borne fruit, since that party succeeded in attracting 40 percent of the voters who had made their decision by then.
3. In the final week of the campaign alone, the Social Democrats managed to pass the 43-percent barrier which theoretically would open the door to an absolute majority.
4. The PRD and the CDS both ended their campaigns without engendering a movement of support capable of attracting the undecided at the last moment. The number of voters who did not decide in favor of one of those parties until Sunday must have been minimal.

### PRD Attracted More in 1985


In any case, contrary to what happened in 1985, there was probably no clear winner in this competition for the undecided vote, although the PSD did pull in almost as many voters during the course of the campaign as all the other parties combined (12 percent, compared to 13 percent). But that advantage was merely proportional to the advantage which the PSD already enjoyed. In other words, the undecided voters wound up being distributed almost proportionately among all the parties.

Growth of Parties During Campaign




Changes in Undecided Vote


First and second  
weeks of campaign



Third week  
of campaign



Sunday, 19 July



In 1985, however, the untried PRD had persuaded four-fifths of its voters during the campaign, thereby succeeding in capturing a good share of the undecided vote. Back then--and we are referring to an identical study that was conducted at the time on the basis of a poll of the same panel--the number of undecided voters was larger at the start of the campaign (38.1 percent) but slightly smaller on election day itself (10.1 percent). The fact that there was more initial indecision in 1985 than in 1987 seems to be due partly to the appearance in 1985 of a new party, which caused some degree of expectant waiting, and partly to the fact that the period preceding this year's election was more enlightening as to the political alternatives before us. It can even be said that the electoral choice was clearer to the voters last Sunday than it had been in the elections 18 months before.

It turns out, then, that despite the superficial means often employed, election campaigns play an important role in helping the citizens decide how to vote. But what is it that leads them to stick to their choice or change it? And to choose to vote for this or that party? Those questions, which were also put to the panel, will be the subject of more thorough analysis in the next edition of EXPRESSO.

11798  
CSO: 3542/114

**CESID AGENTS' ATTEMPT TO IMPLICATE PALESTINIAN FAILS**

35480102 Madrid TIEMPO in Spanish 27 Jul 87 pp 30, 31, 32, 34

[Article by Carlos Bello: "CESID Agents Deceived Judge To Search For Nonexistent Arsenal"; passages within slantlines published in italics; first paragraph is TIEMPO introduction]

[Excerpts] The recent visit to Spain by PLO Political Department Chief Faruk Kaddumi was about to be boycotted because of an action by the CESID (Superior Defense Intelligence Center). The Spanish military intelligence service, /intoxicated/ by Mossad, its Israeli counterpart, tried to implicate a Palestine official with a weapons cache.

The CESID, the Spanish secret military service with intelligence functions in the field of defense and without any authority as judicial police, last June deceived the National High Court to obtain an order for entering and searching the home of an official of the PLO delegation in Madrid.

The judge of Central Court of Proceedings Number Five, Francisco Jose Castro Meijide, who provided the legal order, declared to this weekly that it is "a serious incident" that the search was made by military personnel, for which reason he has asked for a report on the case.

The reason for the search was some alleged weapons hidden in the Madrid home of Palestinian Zarif Shabaneh, but the result of the inspection was negative.

The chief of the PLO delegation in Madrid, Fuad Yasem, expressed his unease to the minister of foreign affairs at what he considerd an /"unfriendly act."/ The Palestinians saw in this action some strange maneuvers aimed at prejudicing the official visit made to Spain last 13 and 14 July by Faruk Kaddumi, the chief of the PLO Political Department and of the foreign affairs of this orgnaization.

According to reports gathered in military circles, the CESID was informed by Mossad, the Israeli secret service with which it maintains excellent relations, about the alleged existence of weapons in the home of Palestine Zarif Shabaneh. After the unsuccessful search, the confidential information of Mossad has been interpreted as a genuine /intoxication/, which in addition has caused the CESID to make a serious slip.

On 11 June there came to the judge on duty of the National High Court, who that day was from Court Number Five, a request for making a search in the home of Zarif Abdul Ghany Shabaneh, a chalet located in the Parque Suizo urban housing area in the municipal district of Alcobendas (Madrid).

The request stated that there was information obtained/"from confidential information,"/ of the entry into Spain of Weapons destined for the /Black September/ Palestinian terrorist group, weapons which were to be used for an attack and which were hidden in the aforementioned chalet.

The request was signed by Commissioner Jose Manuel Tornero, chief of the Intelligence Relations Brigade (BRI), and it added that the search was going to be made with the collaboration of the Foreign Intelligence Brigade.

It was not specified anywhere in the document that the BRI is a group of policemen attached to the intelligence operations of the CESID and that because of that it worked under the orders of the Ministry of Defense. It is the subterfuge this intelligence department uses for obtaining legal authorizations, as was acknowledged to this weekly by an official of the military intelligence services.

However, in the seal used by the BRI, next to its name appears that of the General Directorate of Police and that of the Ministry of Defense, an aspect that passed unnoticed in the court.

#### Cover

Judge Castro Meijide expressed his surprise upon learning through this weekly that military personnel had taken part in the search and said that at no time had he authorized such activity by the CESID, an agency he said has no authority as legal police, but that he had authorized the police. He added that he was unaware that there was a group of policemen attached to this military intelligence agency.

The magistrate declared that he would ask for explanations because he was concerned that such a thing could happen. Days later he had the officials who were involved in the request for entry and search come to his office and he ordered them to make a detailed report on the case.

This has not been the first time that the CESID has obtained legal warrants for making searches and even telephone taps, which could be an activity of doubtful legality.

The requests to the court are always made by the BRI, and once the legal order has been obtained, it has been the military of the CESID who act, leaving the police to provide a facade and serve as a cover.

In the event that an arrest were to result from the search, as would have happened in the case of Palestinian Zarif if weapons had been found, the CESID cannot take any action because it is not a legal police force. That is

why the presence of an operational brigade is required, brigade that would be responsible for accomplishing the proceedings before legal authority. Meanwhile, its presence at the searches is that of a "silent guest," in the opinion of a CESID member.

Last 11 June at 0700, a large group of agents--more than a dozen--all of them in civilian clothing, appeared at the chalet owned by Zarif Shabaneh in the Parque Suizo housing area.

After showing the legal warrant authorizing the police to make the search, CESID agents entered the house and made a careful search.

There were more than five hours of activity in the house, with people coming and going constantly. The military personnel were the ones who made the search and the members of the police brigade provided cover to the activity, and the officials of the BRI attended as spectators.

Finally, they dissolved in apologies. Some of the agents even expressed their sympathy for the Palestinian cause, after reiterating that they were there because of duty. Three days later, the Ministry of Defense sent a crew of masons and in a week all damage had been repaired.

In the 17 years that Zarif Shabaneh has lived in Spain he has never had problems with the law. His life has been one of involvement in sports, particularly physical culture. In 1979 he was the world champion of physical culture for the Spanish federation in this specialty. The next two years he kept the title, and although he no longer represents Spain, he was known as the /"Spanish Palestinian."/

Four years ago he married a Spanish woman with whom he has a 2-month old daughter. In this period he began to work as an administrator in the PLO delegation in Madrid. The desire to live in a quiet place easy access to the Pio XII Avenue, where the PLO office is located, led him and his wife to the Parque Suizo development, where they purchased a duplex chalet.

#### PLO Protests

The chief of the PLO in Madrid, Fuad Yasem, the only member of the delegation who enjoys diplomatic status, declared that Zarif Shabaneh continues to work in the Palestine organization offices and that if there were any doubt with respect to his possible relationship with terrorist organizations he would not be there.

Upon learning of the search, the PLO expressed its protest: /"We informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where they knew nothing about it and they apologized for what had happened."/ says Fuad Yasem. They received no explanation whatever from the Ministry of Defense.

Fuad Yasem declared that the action by security agents is the same in any country and that he does not criticize their work /"however, what they should be asked is: where did the information come from that led them to the home of Zarif? /

/" Those who seek to carry out actions for discrediting us are the enemies of the Palestine cause and are more than well known. It is an attempt to create problems that do not exist so that the name of the PLO will appear linked to terrorism,"/ he said.

The fact that when the search took place the final details for the visit by Kaddumi were being worked out, and there was the rumor that PLO leader Yasser Arafat could come to Spain, has made the Palestinians think that Israel is behind the entire operation.

The BRI, which the CESID uses for obtaining legal warrants, is made up of nearly half a hundred investigating officers of the National Police Corps. Its chief is Commissioner Jose Manuel Tornero, 55 years of age. Around 15 members are assigned to Madrid and the rest distributed throughout Spain.

Although its funds are provided by the General Directorate of Police and in the organizational chart of this department they are administratively included in the Internal Intelligence Brigade, for all purposes they are a part of the CESID, an agency from which they obtain a monthly gratuity of 30,000 pesetas.

#### Fears

Several officials of the Ministry of Interior have tried to control this group of policemen who have worked for the military since the times of the CESED, the service of Admiral Carrero Blanco, but none has been able to do so. Neither the appointment nor change of assignment of one policeman of the BRI can be done without the consent of the chiefs of the CESID.

Among the police, they are viewed with a certain distrust because the military use them for obtaining access to police files and obtaining information that they could not obtain otherwise; they do the same for obtaining legal warrants for entry and search of homes and for authorizations for tapping telephones. This group of policemen, in turn, is kept away from the more sensitive areas of intelligence.

In police intelligence services it is believed that there is no reciprocity by the CESID. Once it was proposed that a group of military personnel work in the Operations Section of the Internal Intelligence Brigade so as to be able to enter the barracks, but Lieutenant General Emilio Alonso Manglano, commander of the CESID, opposed it. The differences between these two intelligence services, the civilian and the military, has had the result that for some year the vacancies that occur in the BRI, which at one time had almost 100 men, have not been filled.

**COMMENTARY CHASTISES EVREN FOR ANTI-ATATURK STANCES**

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 May 87 pp 2, 13

[Commentary by Oktay Akbal]

[Text] General secretary of Rabita offers his thanks to Kenan Evren, president of the Turkish Republic. Apparently, Evren had come to the defense of Rabita against leftists and communists! Here is what General Secretary Attas says:

"Evren supports the 1980 agreement. He says the agreement can be renewed, if necessary. Evren has also responded to the leftist press and depicted them as trying to create a storm in a teacup. Affirming that he has no intentions of resigning, Evren said that the Ataturk principles do not mean leaving individuals to their own devices so far as religion is concerned but, on the contrary, they encourage religious education."

Going even further, Attas accuses writers, journalists who defend the Ataturk reforms: "The situation is a disaster from the viewpoint of journalism. There are over 10,000 Koran schools in Turkey. But despite that, this has become a country where sagacious writers have called it quits and the field is left open to murky writers."

A new book by our colleague Ugur Mumcu entitled "Rabita..." has just come out. You have already seen his comprehensive study on the Rabita organization in this paper. In this new book, Mumcu gets down to further detail. He has gathered the pertinent information and documents about the sharia organization called Rabita, and presents them to the public. Any state official who intends to defend that sharia organization would have to read this book very carefully, and properly understand to whose benefit it is operating.

Speaking in Istanbul, the general secretary of Rabita said their objective was to propagate the "sharia and the sharia order." That is no longer secret! Everyone knows that this organization bears enmity towards Ataturk and institutions of contemporary civilization he created. They want to get rid of Ataturk's

legacy, or whatever remains of it, altogether. And they manage to find voluntary helpers in our country to work towards objective--e.g. "Turkish-Islam" synthesizers, exploiters of religion for political purposes, or those who are caught in the depths of ignorance...

Having heard the words of the general secretary would the president still be able to say, "We would renew our agreement with them if necessary?" Particularly if he has read Mumcu's book, or intends to read it or sees some value in reading it...

It is somewhat astounding and saddening to see such contradictory attitudes on the part of someone who has assumed the office of the president of Ataturk's republic, and someone who also happens to reiterate Ataturk's greatness at every opportunity. Astute statesmen know how to discriminate between friend and foe, or should know it. As Ataturkists we have to know and understand Ataturk's legacy, his life's work and his blueprint for the future. Were religion courses taught at schools during the Ataturk era? Did Ataturk want to see language and history placed under the auspices of an official academy or a government department? Would he have uttered words defending sharia organizations with Saudi Arabian roots? Would he have abolished 1 May celebrations under one pretext or another? Would he have chosen to remain a spectator as reaction, sectarianism and backward views establish hegemony all around the country?

The esteemed president makes a point of noting that he finds 1 May somewhat incongruous: "I cannot bring myself to accept 1 May, which is a communist holiday, as our holiday," the president says. If he cares to study the matter somewhat more in depth he would find out that 1 May is celebrated worldwide as workers' day, in capitalist and socialist countries alike. He would also see that in Poland, which is known to be a communist country, the current administration has tried to suppress the 1 May celebrations. Whereas the same day is celebrated in complete freedom all over Western Europe and the United States. If 1 May cannot be celebrated in Poland or in Turkey, and there is a communist regime in Poland, would there be a communist regime in Turkey as well? Logical deduction may suggest just that...

When the esteemed president says, "Apparently enough time has passed so that discordant voices are heard once again about restoring 1 May as a holiday," he is being grossly unfair to those who want to see 1 May celebrated... What does "discordant voices" mean? By referring to those subscribing to contrary views as "discordant voices" do we succeed in negating the truth of those views? That kind of characterization is clearly wrong. At a time when we desperately want to join the European Community it is even more disheartening to see the head of state depict opposing views as "discordant voices."

Mr Evren should not see us, who want to sustain the revolutionism of Ataturk, as discordant voices. This unfair and erroneous attitude is harmful to the Ataturk revolution itself, before anything else. And our only option is reaching a consensus and establishing some form of unity around the thought of Ataturk. I see great benefit in reminding that once more.

12466  
CSO: 3554/266

## BRIEFS

'THOUGHT CRIMES' TO BE VOIDED--It has been disclosed that Turkey will abolish Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code--which regard thought as a criminal activity and which constitute a hurdle for full democracy--before full membership in the EEC and that it will accede to the authority of the European Human Rights Commission. In a statement to ANKA, a senior Prime Ministry official said that Turkey will definitely abolish Articles 141, 142 and 163 of the Turkish Penal Code before it becomes a full member of the EEC and that, however, this cannot be done soon. [35540296c Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 15 Jul 87 p 3] 9588

## MILITARY EXPERT: FINLAND EXCELS SWEDEN IN COASTAL DEFENSE

Helsinki UUSI SUOMI in Finnish 13 Aug 87 p 10

[Article by Jukka Knuuti: "Norwegian Researcher Thomas Ries Acknowledges Decisions: Finland's Defense Policy More Far-Sighted Than Sweden's, 'Coastal Defense First Rate'"]

[Text] Finns demonstrated a creative strategic far-sightedness in introducing improvements in the defense forces in the 1970s. Finland's political leadership also became aware of the change in the strategic situation in the Nordic area while Swedish decision-makers still, for the most part, believed that the Nordic area was still a strategically stable area.

Researcher Thomas Ries of NUPI, the Norwegian Peace Research Institute, gives recognition to the Finns in comparing Finland's and Sweden's defense policies over the last 15 years.

Thomas Ries considers that the development of crisis control, which has been the subject of much talk in recent times, is based on the observations of the Second Parliamentary Defense Committee.

At the same time that the Finns considered that escalation of tensions in the international as well as the area-wide situation presupposes the gradual improvement of Finland's defense capability, the Swedes were reducing their defense potential the whole time.

Thus according to Ries's assessment, Finland had built a high-level coastal defense system, which is among the world's most modern, by the beginning of the 1980s. The Swedes, who decreased the strike capacity of their naval fleet, sent several delegations to Finland to become familiar with Finland's coastal defense, and as a result of which Sweden purchased the most important components of the Finnish surveillance system, writes Ries.

## Emphasis Away From Gulf of Finland

Ries does not, however, place the blame for the weakening of Sweden's strategic situation completely and solely on the Swedes themselves. After World

War II, the strategic emphasis in the Baltic Sea was transferred away from the Gulf of Finland to Sweden's coastal waters.

But Sweden's mistake was in the fact that this change was not perceived. In addition, according to Ries, Sweden's position has been weakened by the lax attitude of its political leadership toward violations of its territorial waters by submarines. When a U-137 ran aground in front of Karlskrona in 1981, the bourgeois government at that time was not sufficiently assertive. The situation was also later weakened by the understated attitude adopted by the ruling Social Democrats toward these submarine incidents. Also the military men responsible for anti-submarine actions were not authorized in sufficient time to take sufficiently strong countermeasures.

As a consequence of all this, Sweden is militarily in a more difficult situation than ever before since World War II. Ries refers to the continuing underwater violations of Swedish territory, the most recent one being the search for a submarine that concluded in the Bay of Tore.

The situation has not improved as far as appropriations are concerned either since Sweden's defense decision for this year does not at all increase the opportunities for preventing violations of territorial waters by submarines.

#### Finnish Parts in Naval Missiles

The Finns also receive recognition for the manner in which they use defense appropriations. A relatively large portion of Sweden's defense appropriations has gone to expensive development and research programs for missiles, aircraft, and assault tanks, among other things.

The Finns have procured relatively more weapons with less money since they have used the money to procure developed equipment from abroad or manufactured it under license.

On the other hand, the concentration of research on certain areas has provided an opportunity to modify equipment obtained elsewhere to correspond with needs and conditions in Finland.

Thus, for example, Swedish RBS 15SF naval missiles, which have been procured for the navy's missile boats as well as the coastal artillery, are equipped with warheads and guidance systems developed by the Finns, from which comes the marking SF at the end, writes Ries.

10576  
CSO: 3617/138

## NEW AUTOMATIC RIFLE TESTED FOR ARMY, EXPORT

36200321 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 27 Jul 87 pp 151-2

[Text] Testing has begun in the Bundeswehr of a new type of automatic rifle that for the first time fires caseless ammunition.

The rifle does not look anything like a rifle for the trenches, but more like a clarinet case for the orchestra pit in an opera house. On the olive green shape there is even a carrying handle in which the optical system for sighting is concealed.

A tiny square column, barely the length of a match, with the tip of a projectile sticking out of it--that is its secret new cartridge. When it ignites, there is nothing left.

"The Germans have invented the miracle weapon," the London TIMES wrote about the strange noise-maker combination. Thilo Moeller, head of development at the weapons company Heckler & Koch GmbH in Oberndorf on the Neckar, has been working with his technicians for almost two decades on the novel automatic firearm. The new "G 11 rifle system," which, according to Moeller, guarantees a "substantially higher probability of hits" compared to conventional automatic weapons, is finally ready for field service.

With rattling salvos and cracking single shots, Bundeswehr specialists recently began testing the G 11 rifle's suitability to be the new standard issue weapon for the defenders of the fatherland. The weapons testers are supposed to form an opinion by 1989. If they give their OK, about which many experts are in no doubt even today, "the system, with its unique technology, is to be supplied to all military services, starting in 1990" (according to Lt Col Peter Trittermann, spokesman for arms and equipment at the Ministry of Defense).

Everyone, infantryman or artilleryman, is then supposed to turn in his NATO G 3 automatic weapon or Uzi submachine gun and receive the new small suitcase rifle in its place: the rearming will cost the taxpayer more than DM 1 billion. The military publication WEHRTECHNIK wrote that the Bundeswehr was financing "a revolution in a technical and financial sense" with an expenditure of this magnitude.

JANE'S INFANTRY WEAPONS, which is written by experts, also praised the new German firearm: "There can be nodoubt that we are dealing with the most significant development in the field of small arms since the introduction of the first breechloader"--and that was 150 years ago. That was when the Thuringian master locksmith Nikolaus Dreyse invented the "firing pin rifle," along with a useable self-contained cartridge.

The new G 11 is the lightest, shortest, simplest and least sensitive of all automatic weapons. It fires 4.7-mm caliber bullets, the smallest caliber that has ever been chosen for a military rifle, almost as small as that for a simple air rifle.

The principal benefits that the military sees in the fire-spitting lightweight are that for the first time an automatic weapon allows almost recoilless firing and previously unattainable accuracy. The designers in Oberndorf managed this with the help of two fundamental technical developments: the G 11 has a novel, roller rapid action bolt and it is the first rifle in the world to fire case-less ammunition made from powder pressings that burn without any residue.

Instead of conventional cartridges, in which the bullet sits on a powder-filled metal case, the projectile in the G 11 system is literally baked into a solid rectangular powder magazine, developed by the munitions experts at Dynamit Nobel AG.

In this way Moeller and his technicians in Oberndorf succeeded in avoiding the bane of conventional automatic weapons. According to Moeller: "The rifleman fires a large percentage of his ammunition past the target in a crucial situation." The cause is the recoil, which has been unavoidable until now. When firing a continuous salvo, he allows the spray of bullets to go up and to one side, to "drift," as ballistics experts call this inevitable shooting past the target.

But even a carefully aimed single shot, in the experience of the military, usually missed as the result of stress and aiming errors. So the new weapon offers and "automatically limited" three-shot burst "with defined scatter" in addition to single-shot and continuous fire. The effect, in the opinion of a company spokesman, "is that at least one bullet from the burst reaches its target and renders the opponent unfit for combat."

The short, unorthodox "propellant charge" plays a large part in the rapid rate of fire. Because of its square shape, it can be fed with special ease from the 50-round magazine to the "roller bolt system," which reloads at a rate of 30 milliseconds per round.

The minicaliber and the elimination of the heavy cartridge cases also reduce the weapon's combat weight. Even with 50 rounds in the magazine and a full spare magazine, the G 11 weighs less than the conventional G 3 without a single cartridge. An additional technical advantage: The G 11 is the only automatic rifle without an aperture for ejecting the cartridge--which is otherwise the inevitable Achilles heel for the entry of dust and water, and the cause of potential problems.

In 1936 the U.S. army was the first to abandon the customary repeating rifle and introduce a semiautomatic self-loading rifle. The user only needed to press the trigger, but he could not fire bursts. The first fully automatic rifle was developed by the Germans during World War II. It was the model 44 assault rifle, the technical forerunner of modern automatic weapons such as the Soviet Kalashnikov AK-47. The performance limits of all these models lie in the problem of recoil.

The G 11's extremely flat trajectory bullet has immediately proven to be one of the most deadly projectiles in the tests, in spite of its extremely small caliber of only 4.7 mm. Even at 600 meters it can penetrate steel helmets and armored vests. Yet the conspicuously long pointed bullet was developed for combat over distances of only 300 meters, "because required combat distances are becoming shorter and shorter" (according to Moeller).

These characteristics, lauded as "advantages" in the perverted logic of the military, have meanwhile attracted the attention of the weapons technicians of friendly armies, such as the armed forces of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Portugal and France. "We are pleased not only for reasons of standardization that our G 11 system has become of interest to other NATO countries as well," was the opinion of Bundeswehr spokesman Trittermann.

The Americans have even ordered their own version for \$ 3.8 million. It is being developed by GHGS (Gesellschaft fuer huelsenlose Gewehr-Systeme mbH) [Caseless Weapons Systems Company, Ltd.] in Bonn, which is owned equally by Heckler & Koch and the Feldmuehle subsidiary Dynamit Nobel AG. The project director: Thilo Moeller.

It is also regarded as certain that sooner or later those people who cannot simply order the G 11 system, but would like to have it, will be using it.

Lt Col Trittermann: "The East bloc has always succeeded in copying our weapons. They will manage to do it this time as well."

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## FRG MILITARY USE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY DESCRIBED

Heidelberg INFORMATIK SPEKTRUM in German No 1, Feb 87 pp 12-16

[Article by H.W. Hofmann of the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich: "Use of Modern Information Technology in the Military: Responsible and Necessary for the Defender"]

[Excerpts] Following a brief description of the areas in which information technology can be used, examples will be given in an attempt to show the priorities and trends in each of these areas. Toward this end, we will also discuss the new concept of research and technology of the federal defense minister; certain priorities can be clearly seen in this concept.

Table 1 provides a summary of the important areas in which computers and program systems can be used within the Bundeswehr; frequently, however, these areas tend to overlap. In addition to the purpose of the application and/or the important designations for each type of application, examples of systems which have already been introduced or which are planned, as well as more recent references for more detailed information, are provided.

Table 1. Summary of Important Areas In Which Computers and Program Systems are Used in the Bundeswehr

Area of Application	Function/Designation	Examples	References
Administrative systems ([illeg.] information systems and office systems)	Support for administrative tasks	PERFIS (personnel) MILSTRAP (logistics)	[1 - 3]
Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence systems - CCCI	Combat support in the most diverse areas and command levels in the tactical/strategic area	EIFEL, DISTEL, [4-8](general) SYLT, SUSYLOG, [9-14](air f.) GEADGE, ACCS, [15-18](army) HEROS, the [19-21](navy) army air defense intelligence and control sys., [22-25](communications and intelligence) the artillery command, information & control system, MHQ	
Weapons systems and munitions	Increasingly an integral part of nearly all complex weapons systems; more and more also with munitions (so-called "intelligent" munitions); real-time requirements	MRCA/TORNADO, LEO2, GEPARD, MAVERICK, MILAN, HOT PARS3, BUS-SARD, SADARM, TGSM, Polyphem, PARM	[26-29](weapons systems) [30-32](munitions) [33-35](combat robots & AI)
Others, e.g. - weapons systems simulators - operational anal. models, combat models, operational planning practice  - command & staff simulators	Other support functions for - education/training - planning, decision-making & evaluation processes  - staff training	Flight, driving and navigation simulators, dueling & firing simulators VECTOR-2, STO- CHADE, KORA, TREND, BASIS KORA/OA, WES- TEX, SALAMIS, Command & Staff Simulators	[36,37] [38, 39] [40,41]

Overall, it can be assumed that roughly 10 to 15 percent of the approximately DM 50 billion defense budget--or DM 5 to 7.5 billion annually--is spent on the acquisition and operation of modern information technology--the majority for weapons and munitions, and it is here that major problems exist regarding definition.

The individual areas of application are described somewhat more precisely below. The objective is to show that in addition to the early-warning system at the nuclear strategic level (in which the Bundeswehr is not involved), which is often a spectacular focal point of public discussion, there is a broad spectrum of important areas of application in the conventional sector. At the same time the systems and technologies will be indicated which are evaluated in subsequent chapters. (Readers in a hurry may jump immediately to Chapter 2.)

## 1.2 Command, Control, Communication and Intelligence Systems

In contrast to the administrative systems, the (tactical) command, control, communication and intelligence (CCCI) systems under consideration here are used for direct operational support for the most diverse functions and command levels in a defensive situation.

Since the success of rapid, concise decision-making--in the military more so than in other areas--depends on large amounts of data which are usually structured in very diverse ways, these types of systems have been developed worldwide at great expense. The first systems in the area of air defenses were installed as early as the end of the 1950's in bunker areas: based on the considerations and experiences of World War II, the chain of action involving observation, recognition, identification, target tracking, estimation of threat, weapons selection, target assignment and control of weapon engagement, was at that time already largely outlined and was viewed as particularly time critical.

On the other hand, operational command systems, which are presented as a system of higher and lower-ranking control loops, are considered to be extremely complex systems in which additional requirements for fast reaction times, protection against enemy action, security against infiltration and sabotage, increasing integration, the necessity of formalizing command procedures, strides toward fewer breakdowns and greater flexibility in use, acceptance and training problems, etc., represent additional obstacles (see [7], for example). Therefore it is no longer any wonder that the oft quoted software crisis had such an affect in this area that the hope harbored by many in the 1960's and 1970's of being able to develop those kinds of systems within one large-scale design had to be abandoned--not least of all for financial reasons, since the amount of funding originally envisioned had in most cases long since been exceeded--in favor of a more evolutionary process.

An example of this is the general command information system, EIFEL, of the German Air Force: Planned as early as the 1960's, experimental operation took place from 1973-77 initially at three locations with approximately 80 data stations (with the Siemens 4004 using BS 1000). In the meantime, however, EIFEL has moved out of the prototype-like test-system stage and has been in

use throughout the German Air Force for some time under the designation EIFEL 1 (now converted to the Siemens 75xx using BS 2000). According to [9] it represents, in its present configuration, the largest data processing infrastructure within NATO. With five computer centers connected by means of high-capacity data links, approximately 300 terminals are currently in operation at over 100 locations in central Europe, and continuous system improvements and expansions are expected to provide for ever growing acceptance within the air force. In its final form EIFEL will include 16 computer centers to which 240 air force units and duty stations are connected by over 1000, in part, intelligent terminals. The integration of subsystems is planned, particularly as qualitative improvements, e.g. DISTEL (detailed flight engagement planning for combat aircraft), SYLT (engagement planning, air transport) and SUSYLOG (logistical engagement support). In addition, there is a demand for increased interoperability with the NATO command systems (e.g. GEADGE for air defense) and with other national command and technical information systems.

In view of the number of command information systems and their mutual interfaces, NATO has decided to reach agreement on universal interface standards for command information systems. The nations within the alliance have formed the Allied Data Systems Interoperability Agency (ADSIA). The Bundeswehr is actively involved in preparing generally binding standards (see [10]).

The command information systems of the army (HEROS in particular) and the navy (MHQ) will not be gone into in further detail here, nor will high-performance and interference-free communications and intelligence systems in which computer systems are likewise of fundamental importance and which are decisive in terms of the success of the engagement. We refer in this regard to the encryption problem which represents a classic computer application.

Another application in this regard is electronic warfare (ELOKA). This includes, in addition to classic communication intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) which is primarily directed toward collecting information on enemy radar equipment, electronic protective measures (against enemy communication and radar intelligence), as well as electronic countermeasures (ECM and ECCM). Substantial progress has been made in this area through the use of computers, although here, too, the trend has been toward real-time data processing.

It is conceivable in this example, however, that a report on the takeoff of the combat aircraft from the COMINT sector of the British fleet--by listening to Argentine air traffic control radio traffic perhaps--was sent out to the ships ahead of time which would further clarify the interaction of COMINT, ELINT, ECM and weapons engagement.

#### 1.4 Other Areas of Application

Of the range of other areas of application of information technology in the military sector, only three will be touched on briefly here.

First of all there is its use, also widespread in the civilian sector, for driving, flight and navigation simulators, as well as for dueling and marksmanship simulators. With the latter (planned for the Leopard 1 and 2 combat tanks, armored infantry combat vehicles, PARS systems and antitank helicopters, for example, as of the beginning of the 1990's), marksmanship training will be integrated into casualty control. In addition, very complex simulators will also be used to an extensive degree in military technological development as research, development and testing simulators. More detailed information on this subject can be found in [37].

Another extremely comprehensive area of application involves computer-controlled operations analysis models as a part of the quantitative instrumentation used in analysis, planning and evaluation, including everything from purely analytical combat models to very complex discrete simulation models for various possible solutions and levels of abstraction. Their importance is clear when one considers that in peacetime computer controlled combat models often provide the only opportunity for investigating the efficiency of weapons, command information and intelligence systems, the structures of the armed forces and the tactical and strategic concepts in a reproducible manner and under nearly realistic operating conditions. An empirical review based on historical battles is usually abandoned for lack of adequate graphics. In view of the rapid technological development with respect to weapons, they would also be of little relevance. Troop testing and combat exercises are also necessarily subject to less than realistic safety requirements. Therefore, only the formal simulation remains. Chapter 5 goes into the use of a detailed combat simulation system.

Finally, it is obvious that combat models developed at great expense should also be used for the training of military commanders. Thus, the computer controlled operational planning system KORA/OA (a special corps master model) has been used regularly since 1978 for general staff training of army officers; the air force and navy use corresponding systems (WESTEX, SALAMIS). Whether and to what extent the instrumentation developed can also be used for training outside the scope of general staff training [41] is currently being investigated. Under consideration in this regard are war games simulators (so-called command & staff simulators) which provide the opportunity to use the hardware of parts of the operational command systems already in place or planned (i.e. EIFEL, HEROS, MHQ) as a base with the objective of not only better utilizing the relatively expensive peripheral equipment but also familiarizing the staff people with the peripherals, the working environment and the support software available under nearly realistic conditions.

### 1.5 Future Development Trends

Overall, the following can be concluded regarding the use of information technology in the military sector:

The scope and intensity of the use of computers and program systems in the armed forces are extensive and are increasing. The major indicator in this regard is primarily the diversity of the applications. As in the civilian sector, the computer is penetrating more and more nearly all areas of the military.

On the other hand, the distinct pace-setting function of the military sector regarding computer and program development no longer appears to be present today, at least not to the extent that it was in the 1950's and 1960's, for example. Instead, for reasons of cost alone, but also due to the relatively long development time for defense material which can scarcely be reconciled with the rapid development of new generations of data processing systems, computer technologies and programming methods developed primarily for the civilian market are used and if necessary adapted to meet the special requirements of the military sector. The pace-setting function of earlier years seems to have been transferred more to other areas (e.g. sensor technology, especially radar, laser and infrared technology, etc., and certain specialized areas).

This can also be seen in the new research and technology concept of the Federal Ministry of Defense in which the following technical requirements in particular are mentioned [42]:

- comprehensive and more automated real-time intelligence
- prompt, crosslinked gathering and data-processing-based evaluation of intelligence information as a basis for command decisions
- increasing the firepower on the battlefield and deep within the territory by using "intelligent" conventional munitions
- effective direct and indirect protection even under NBC conditions

Faced with these requirements, those of weapons system platforms, for example, take a back seat.

The total budget of approximately DM 800 million for 1986 (1.6 percent of the defense budget) is broken down as follows:

- weapon employment/weapon effect	approx. 29 percent
- intelligence/command	approx. 26.5 percent
- mobility/transport	approx. 22 percent
- protection	approx. 11 percent
- planning, decision-making, evaluation assistance	approx. 7.9 percent

The highest rates of increase in these areas, from 30 to over 40 percent (for the 1987 planning year using 1984 as the base year), are shown in the areas of protection (with the emphasis on reducing detectability, on warning sensors and on NBC protection), weapon employment and weapon effect (especially "intelligent" target approximation, terminal guidance and effective mechanisms), as well as command and intelligence (with the emphasis on signal processing, pattern recognition, information transfer) [43].

Certain programs in the United States, on the other hand, such as the "Strategic Computing" program initiated in 1983 by DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency), may initially indicate much more spectacular things. However, when one considers the concrete objectives to be achieved within two five-year periods, they appear (at least as planned objectives for an experimental system) far less spectacular. These objectives are the development of an autonomous combat vehicle, an expert system for pilots and a conduct of operations system for aircraft carriers [44, 45].

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**ARMED FORCES TO ACQUIRE POINT DEFENSE MISSILE SYSTEM**

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 29 Aug 87 p 3

[Article: "New Missile System For Finland At Cost of 800 Million Markkas"]

[Text] Finland plans to acquire a new air defense missile system, which will fill in the defense gap remaining after the previously purchased area defense and close-in missiles.

Funds for placing an order for the point defense missile chosen will be included in the government's budget for next year. The order will cost altogether a total of 800 million markkas. Acquisitions will be spread over the years 1988-93, with 70 million markkas to be spent next year.

Both the government and Defense Staff are said to be as yet undecided as to whether the missiles will be purchased from the East or West.

Air defense personnel have preferred Western missiles, among other reasons because there is little enthusiasm for the Soviet SAM-3 area defense missiles.

More than their desires, however, factors playing a role in the decision will be political considerations, trade policy and logic. All previous air defense missiles have been bought from the Soviet Union, with other missile types being purchased from the West. The missile purchase should also help balance the huge Soviet trade deficit with Finland.

Three Soviet missile systems are being considered: SAM-8, SAM-9 and SAM-13. Of these, the SAM-9 has been acquired by Hungary, Poland, Yugoslavia and Vietnam, among other armed forces.

Western offerings are the Swedish RBS, the English Rapier, French Crotale and the Swiss-American ADATS.

According to the Defense Staff, it will take at least two years before the new missiles begin to arrive in Finland. The competition study is still continuing. Point defense missiles would be needed, for example, to protect the Rovaniemi Air Force Base, the Armored Brigade, and Helsinki.

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**NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, COUNTRY'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE VIEWED**

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 25 Aug 87 p 3

[Op Ed Article by Finn Sollie, the Group for Nordic Area Issues: "Nuclear Disarmament on Continent May Produce Increased Tension in Northern Seas"]

[Text] There has been enormous progress in the talks on reducing the superpowers' arsenal of nuclear weapons. The primary focus of the talks has been on the land-based intermediate-range missiles which the superpowers have in Europe or which can reach targets in Europe. In the negotiations these "Euroweapons" are also linked to the intermediate-range weapons in Asia (double zero solution), while sea-based weapons systems are not included.

Even though important and difficult questions must be solved before a genuine disarmament agreement on nuclear weapons is ready, the proposals which are now on the table give grounds for optimism. An agreement to remove the intermediate-range missiles may also lead to a reduction of tactical short-range weapons in Europe, and it may be crucial for a decision to significantly reduce strategic nuclear weapons. These are weapons of such a range and character that the United States and the Soviet Union can use them directly against each other from bases on their own territory or from ships, without depending on bases in other countries.

**Submarine Weapons**

There are no ongoing talks concerning the separate limitation or reduction of sea-based nuclear weapons. These are first and foremost the long-range missiles that can be launched from submarines, but submarine-based cruise missiles of intermediate range (up to 3,000 kilometers) are also gradually acquiring greater significance. The tendency to concentrate a larger part of the nuclear striking power in submarines steadily continues, and implementation of a reduction in the sum total of strategic weapons on land must therefore be expected, while the submarine weapons are retained and further developed both in number and quality. The reason for this is, above all, that submarines are more difficult to detect, verify, and monitor than the land-based systems and are, of course, far less vulnerable.

### **Has Its Price**

A real reduction in the superpowers' mind-boggling arsenal of hyperdestructive nuclear weapons must be welcomed by all who wish to ensure mankind's existence. Yet here, too, progress has its price. Large reductions in some of the most important weapons systems will change key features of the power structure which has evolved over a long period of time. Fundamental assumptions of military and political thinking and planning will be altered, and a need for adjustments and modifications will arise in order to maintain the balance of power which all parties view as essential for stability and security in Europe and between the superpowers.

It is mostly the West Germans who look skeptically at some of the disarmament initiatives now being discussed and who fear that removal of the nuclear weapons will reduce deterrence and weaken security from political pressure and military aggression. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons is especially meaningful to West Germany with its limited territory to use for defense. Moreover, nuclear weapons are a cheap alternative, and they link security in Europe to America's nuclear umbrella.

### **Assurance**

If America's nuclear weapons are removed from Europe, the danger of Soviet superiority in conventional weapons will increase, and one runs the risk anew of becoming dependent on the more dubious and less trustworthy doctrine of massive retaliation with strategic nuclear weapons, rather than on the graded deterrence found in the principle of step-by-step escalation which is adjusted according to the threat (the principle of flexible response). To West Germany it may therefore seem essential to retain the assurance that lies in the 72 old Pershing missiles which the Federal Republic owns and which can be armed with American nuclear warheads, while at the same time one hopes for some sort of deterrent effect from the French nuclear weapons and for increased security through more vigorous teamwork and better coordination of defense in western Europe, primarily through closer collaboration with France, the strongest ally on the Continent.

### **Particularly Vulnerable**

West Germany's defense requirements are special, but some of the problems there may also have parallels in Norway. The enormous buildup of Soviet strength on the Kola Peninsula means that Norway is in a particularly vulnerable position. The concentration of nuclear striking power in strategic submarines operating in northern waters and the significance of naval warfare and maritime supply lines for the outcome of a protracted land war in Europe are such that Norwegian territory and northern seas have acquired a central place in the military's strategic thinking and planning. This holds true both in the direct nuclear balance of terror between the superpowers and in relation to the defense of Europe, which depends on supplies and reinforcements. Here the transatlantic shipping lanes are threatened by the Soviet fleet which operates out of the Kola Peninsula, in the same way that German submarines menaced transports throughout two world wars, in the last from bases in Norway.

There is nothing to suggest that the importance of Norway's strategic position in the international balance of power will diminish in the future. On the contrary, the evolution of power politics and weapons technology that has drawn Norwegian territory in toward the center of high-level political conflict seems to be following a pattern in which Norway becomes more and more vulnerable.

#### Buoy Theft

It may turn out that the dismantlement of nuclear weapons which we all hope for and which is concentrated mainly on land-based weapons systems will lead to the even greater importance of sea-based weapons. This holds true both in the strategic balance of power between the superpowers and in the conventional defensive capacity of Europe, which depends entirely on the supply lines. In both ways, sea-based nuclear weapons and conventional naval warfare, the Soviets' northern fleet plays a very central role. Norway's northern territory will thereby also acquire greater military and political interest and notice, along with the tension that accompanies them. In a sense, the episodes we now witness of cable cutting and buoy theft in the Barents Sea are merely preliminary signs of strong and increasing tension in Norwegian territory.

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CSO: 36390090

## ARMY ACQUIRING ERICSSON MOBILE AIR DEFENSE RADAR

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Aug 87 p 3

[Article by Liv Hegna: "Army Wants to Have Mobile Radar"]

[Text] A new and hitherto untested principle will be introduced into the army's antiaircraft command: mobile radar which can track combatant forces on the ground. The system has been developed by Ericsson Radio System in Goteborg in collaboration with the Norwegian firm Nordic Electronic System in Halden.

The Norwegian firm has produced the software for the radar and will receive orders for considerable supplies in connection with the delivery. Development of the prototype has cost 40 million kroner.

Lieutenant Colonel Knut Nilsen, chief of staff in the First Artillery Regiment, told AFTENPOSTEN that the goal is acquisition of a mobile radar system for all the brigades. Each brigade will receive three mobile radar devices. The operational plans aim at cooperation among the three systems in order to give greater survival capacity to the radar cover. The deployment of mobile radar devices in bunches of three will provide satisfactory territorial coverage.

The new mobile radar from Ericsson is the only one of its kind in the world by dint of its great mobility in terrain.

The first mass-produced radar will probably be delivered in 1990. It can serve various antiaircraft systems. In the army's case, it will be used together with the new antiaircraft system Robot 70, which is under procurement at the moment. This delivery will be completed in 1993 and will significantly increase the army's capacity to fight off air attacks.

The prototype of the mobile radar from Ericsson Radio System will be presented on Friday to the First Artillery Regiment in Fredrikstad.

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## INCREASED SUSPICION OF EAST BLOC SPYING IN NAVAL BASE AREAS

## More Soviet Fishing Boats

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 10 Aug 87 p 8

[Article by Lars Christiansson and Staffan Nilsson: "Mass Anchoring of Soviet Fishing Vessels Off Gotland and Oland--Soviet Ships Perplex Defense"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Large groups of Soviet fishing vessels often anchor in Swedish territorial waters off the coast of Gotland and Oland. Swedish security services have not seen any indication that the crews are engaged in any illegal activities.

But Soviet security-policy ambitions may be behind this conduct.

The appearance of the fishing vessels is a subject which has also caused much puzzlement among the local population. SVENSKA DAGBLADET, with the help of the Coast Guard Centers at Visby and Karlskrona, has prepared a chart of how many ships have anchored in Swedish territorial waters since 1986.

The total was 542 foreign ships. Of these, 530 were Soviet. Forty-eight were other than fishing vessels.

One individual who is pondering the strange behavior of the Soviet fishing fleet is Jarl Andersson, who was born in Segerstad in southeast Oland. He has his cabin close by the lighthouse.

## Get Permission

"Sometimes the weather is not at all bad," he said. "Still they get permission to anchor here. Sometimes they stay for several days, and move back and forth to the beach."

Jarl Andersson has also noticed that the fishing vessels do not always remain at anchor.

The Coast Guard and coastal radio personnel often have contact with the Soviet ships. They have the following views and explanations for this behavior:

Soviet fishermen are believed to have different regulations, and are more inclined to seek shelter when warned of heavy weather than other fishermen. That normally happens as soon as there is a warning of fresh winds, winds of about 15 meters per second. Soviet trawlers are generally smaller and less seaworthy than those of other countries.

Trawler crews deliver their catches to a mother ship. These ships are often at sea for months, which can mean that they take rest periods along a sheltered coast.

The decision to seek shelter is made for all by the mother ship, and when they pass in and out of Swedish fishing zones they are obliged to report to Swedish authorities.

Jarl Andersson and some of his fisherman friends from Segerstad have tried to establish contact with the Soviet fishermen in a more unconventional way. When they went out to set their nets they rowed into a cluster of Soviet fishing vessels.

"But we could not establish contact with them," said Andersson. "No matter how loudly we called to them, we did not get the slightest response."

Andersson remembers that several years ago two Soviet fishing boats sought "emergency shelter" in fair weather at the same time as a military exercise was taking place.

"They anchored in the radar shadow behind the Segerstad lighthouse. They were directly behind it so that they could not be detected by the radar on the southern cape," he explained.

This conduct and the mass anchorings have been studied by the Defense Staff Intelligence and Security Division. When ships seek emergency shelter in fair weather it is puzzling to the Swedish security services.

However, no illegal intelligence activity or security-threatening activity has been noticed.

The Defense Staff has two theories which could be a security policy explanation.

According to the first theory, Swedish authorities can grow accustomed to the appearance of the fishing fleet, that they now and then appear in Swedish territorial waters without doing anything unlawful. In this way fishing vessels, without causing suspicion, can be utilized for illegal purposes when Soviet authorities decide they are needed.

Admiral Gorshkov, who built up the modern Soviet fleet and the country's naval strategy wrote in his book "Statens Sjömakt" [Sea Power of the State], "in the concept of seapower of the state among the main components are the transport and fishing fleets and their ability to satisfy the needs of the state."

Therefore fishing vessels, when needed, are a part of the Soviet military structure and intelligence service. It is also known that there are intelligence personnel onboard vessels of the fishing fleet.

According to the second theory, which does not exclude but rather complements the first, the Soviets regard the Baltic as an inland sea. The fishing fleets contribute to and reinforce that picture.

According to Swedish law, ships employed for commercial purposes are not to be considered as state ships, even though owned by the state. Therefore normal entry regulations apply to the Soviet fishing fleet.

The most common anchorages for Soviet ships around Gotland are around Hoburgen, and off Ostergarn and Faludden. Near Oland they anchor off Kapelludden and Segerstad, among other places.

#### Poles in Restricted Areas

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 18 Aug 87 p 6

[Article by Roger Magnergard: "Six Poles Arrested in Restricted Area"; first paragraph is SVENSKA DAGBLADET introduction]

[Text] Six Polish citizens were arrested in a military restricted area in the vicinity of the secret Musko Base in the southern Stockholm archipelago over the weekend.

They all entered the restricted area via the land route, through the tunnel to Musko. They were caught in the forest by military police.

The security police were informed and became involved, but the six were released after they were identified.

"So far they are only suspected of having violated the public notice about the restricted area," said Joakim Lotman, military liaison with the police in Handen. "We are investigating them further."

#### Three Occasions

The six came on three different occasions over the weekend, beginning on Friday. They were all walking in a military protected area when they were arrested.

Was there any indication that they were engaging in any illegal intelligence activity when they were arrested?

"Not so far. As I said we are investigating them further to find out why so many were caught in the same area in such a short time."

What explanation can there be?

"This is of course the time for vacations, and nature is calling. They could have been hunting for mushrooms or berries. We have encountered that before."

Have you found any equipment which would indicate espionage?

"Nothing that we could produce today."

#### Investigating Background

On Monday Joakim Lotman talked with the military officers and enlisted men who arrested the six. None of them attempted to escape after they were discovered.

During the week those arrested will be investigated further, and they will be questioned as to why they were in a restricted area.

Last summer four Polish citizens were arrested when they anchored their sailboat in a prohibited area near the Musko base. Onboard the boat the police found equipment which showed that they were involved in illegal intelligence activity, including markings on charts.

But since the prosecutor could not establish who had written on the chart the case was dropped. Under Swedish law there can be no collective punishment of a group for a crime which perhaps only one or two of the group's members has committed.

Joakim Lotman expects to complete the investigation into the six Polish citizens by the end of the week.

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**EXPERT ON SUBMARINE WARFARE: INCIDENTS TO CONTINUE**

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 1 Aug 87 p 5

[*'Debate'* Article by Ingemar Myhrberg, civil engineer and journalist:  
"Search Unlikely to Succeed"; first two paragraphs are DAGENS NYHETER  
introduction]

[Text] "It may be that the fact that you react and do something about each contact is a good thing because it frightens submarines away. But the measure of your success is that someone thousands of miles away decides not to continue. And you will never know that because the submarine indications will not stop on that account. It is a classic problem." That is the opinion of American submarine warfare expert Norman Friedman, quoted here by Ingemar Myhrberg.

The submarines have come to stay, whether they are there or not, according to the American submarine expert.

The submarine chases that are as frequent as they are unsuccessful have been going on for almost 8 years now. It is as if time has stood still in spite of the expenditure of billions of kronor and ample opportunity to practice the maneuver. On this occasion too we are talking about "mysterious wave disturbances" and "some object" said to be moving beneath the surface. Depth charges and hand grenades disturb the night and are destroying the fish for a long time to come. A doctoral candidate in the field of zoology claims that it is young seals who are being bombed, but of course the military denies this.

In the first big submarine chase near Uto in the Stockholm archipelago in 1980 the wreckage of a ship and a high rock on the ocean floor were shot at and attacked. This was determined when divers and video cameras were sent down afterward. However these films, so embarrassing to the Navy, have been spirited away so effectively that the Commander in Chief [OB] has still not been able to find them in spite of a request from the Supreme Administrative Court on 26 November 1985.

The submarine chase in Tore is also being conducted so amateurishly that one might almost suspect that it is being staged deliberately to create public

support for another anti-sub force while people are on vacation. In that case the stakes are anything but small. A complete force includes some 16 vessels and half a dozen helicopters. If the bombing is meaningless, as Emil Svensson maintains--then what else is it but a show and a play to the gallery?

The public is starting to be justifiably skeptical. Can the Navy really be so incompetent that it fails continually? Where do all the "definite" submarines go that were bottled up and about to be forced to the surface but suddenly disappeared as if they had gone up in smoke? Can we even be sure that it is submarines that are being hunted? Can the large number of visual and sonar indications be interpreted as something else?

I passed these questions along to an American expert, Dr Norman Friedman, who held a seminar at the Grand Hotel in Stockholm on 9-10 February of this year on the topic of anti-submarine warfare. At the desks sat some 20 representatives of the Navy, the Materiel Command and the defense industry who paid 5,000 kronor apiece to hear about the latest findings in anti-submarine technology.

According to the advance publicity Dr Friedman has a profound knowledge of anti-submarine operations around the world--in the Atlantic, the Pacific, the Mediterranean and the Arctic.

After the seminar he presented some opinions on problems here in Sweden. In the first place we are the only ones who have had indications of so-called Soviet minisubs. It is true that the Soviet Union has a submarine model that carries two smaller ones but it is a rescue vessel and has little relevance as far as we are concerned. As long as we do not force a submarine to the surface it will be very hard to know what we have really seen, he said.

The most characteristic features of submarine detection are the large number of false contacts, the ambiguity, the difficulty in knowing exactly what has happened. They are like apparitions, one just cannot be sure.

Dr Friedman said he did not want to criticize or explain away what has been going on here for so long. But from a historical point of view the number of contacts that later turned out to have other explanations has always been much greater than the number of real contacts.

During the Falklands war the ratio between real and imaginary contacts was about 1 to 100. During combat people are nervous and tend to interpret almost anything as a submarine contact, which of course can also happen in peacetime.

It is also possible that the repeated submarine hunts are an enormous error on our part, that we are hunting submarines despite the fact that there are none out there.

"There is enough junk in the Baltic Sea so that imaginative people will always be able to see something. The world is full of phenomena that can produce submarine-like echoes. You will never be able to be absolutely sure until the day you bring a submarine to the surface. Until then it is impossible to know anything for certain," he said.

One of the Submarine Defense Commission's strongest pieces of evidence was a sonar indication with a Doppler effect, which indicates a moving object and is said to be a very sure sign. Dr Friedman also dismissed that.

"A Doppler effect can occur because of currents and other things. You still do not know for sure. It could be a submarine but it could also be something else."

The gist of Dr Friedman's argument is that the grounded U-137 is the only absolutely certain and tangible piece of evidence so far. In a manner of speaking it is the only submarine we have "brought up." If it arrived here because of navigational error, even that piece of evidence falls apart.

But let us assume that the OB's assurance that the submarine intruded deliberately is correct. There is still a possibility that the Soviet Union halted the incursions after what was an extremely embarrassing blunder for them. With Olof Palme as a good ambassador for the Soviet arms reduction initiative it would have been very ill-advised to sabotage their own foreign policy by directing such hostile actions against his homeland.

If any people of the type of North and Poindexter in the cellars of the Red House in the Kremlin or in the Soviet defense leadership had secretly ordered the U-137's senseless incursion into Gasefjarden, their actions would have been halted immediately the minute the political leadership found out about them. Instead the opposite seems to have occurred. The violations appeared to increase dramatically after the U-137 incident with an almost epidemic distribution in both time and space.

Such an epidemic could be explained by what Dr Friedman calls the observations of "imaginative people" and "false submarine echoes." How can we ever create clarity as to whether it is really submarines that are being hunted up in Tore? Any more than we could prove this on previous occasions?

The submarine doctor said he could not offer any patent solution. It is difficult to hunt submarines in the Baltic, especially in shallow water.

"I think it is very unlikely that you will ever succeed. It has been impossible to prove it when people in other countries have thought they saw submarines."

The American Navy once made a very well-known and widely-reported experiment. During a sub-hunting exercise in which the Navy used its own submarines, they were withdrawn without notifying the search leadership. The result was that the submarine searchers continued to record just as many indications as before.

"It may be that the fact that you react and do something about each contact is a good thing because it frightens submarines away. But the measure of your success is that someone thousands of miles away decides not to continue. And you will never know that because the submarine indications will not stop on that account. It is a classic problem."

But is it wise to spend billions on hunting submarines that may not even exist? Shouldn't we first gather facts, find out if the incursions are really taking place?

"The absurd thing about this is that if you do not spend a lot of money, you will never gather any facts. It is the only possibility to separate the wheat from the chaff, to increase the chances of determining what it is you are seeing or to obtain tangible evidence by forcing a submarine to the surface."

To sum up--the submarines have come to stay, whether they are there or not. And it will cost us quite a lot of tax kronor in the years ahead. No prime minister will dare to tell his commander in chief to stop shooting at the submarines he thinks he sees. Commander Emil Svensson is a little braver in this connection and makes a clear point when he says that we should stop using bombs in Tore and gather evidence instead, because the use of the weapons is not having any effect.

This would have the added benefit of ending the hysterical reports, especially in the evening papers. By focusing on one "eyewitness" after another they create even more witnesses who upset and confuse the entire operation.

An alarmed general public does more harm than good if one wants to make a serious search for a submarine. On the other hand if one wants to create public support for building up the Navy, which has suffered sharp cutbacks since the 1960's, these same evening newspapers and the general public are the best possible allies.

If we attempt to look into the future, the most probable development is that after receiving additional billions for additional anti-submarine forces the Navy will eventually feel satisfied, tire of the strenuous and unsuccessful chases and at last declare that we have now become so effective that the enemy no longer dares to send any submarines here.

6578  
CSO: 3650/186

## ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH MILITARY RESTRICTED AREA ON SYRIAN BORDER

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 8 May 87 p 14

[Text] Nusaybin--The price assessed for the public expropriation of 29 residences and business places in the Yeni Turan district of Nusaybin, situated in the buffer zone at the Turkish-Syrian border, has been rejected by Gendarmerie General Command (GGC). Brigadier General Erdin Aygun said an investigation may be conducted with regard to the assessment commission.

It had been decided to expropriate residences and business places in the Yeni Turan district so as to allow the creation of a restricted area--a strip of land 50 meters wide along the barbed wire. Therefore, a five-person commission had been established, consisting of Public Property Director Mehmet Ali Senol, municipal officials Kasim Aslan and Abdulkadir Gumus, director of land surveying and agricultural engineer. The commission assessed a total of TL951 million for the 29 residences and business places. This was found excessive, if not exorbitant, by the GGC.

Upon receiving instructions from the GGC, Mardin 22d Mobile Gendarmerie Brigade Commander Brig Gen Aygun organized a meeting with the 29 proprietors. The newly-created commission reduced the assessment to TL330 million. Only 2 of the proprietors agreed to the new price whereas 27 were unhappy with it. Officials declared that monies of the 27 proprietors would be placed in escrow and the way of litigation was open.

12466  
CSO: 3554/267

## STOLTENBERG, RIESENHUBER DISAGREE ON SPACE PROGRAM FUNDING

36200002Duesseldorf WIRTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 14 Aug 87 pp 14, 15

[Text] An internal position paper shows that the Research and Technology Minister's prestigious space program is encountering opposition from FRG Finance Minister, Gerhard Stoltenberg. However, industrial firms also oppose the planned expenditure of billions of DM.

Bombastic words are not spared when a lofty objective is at stake: "Our children's freedom of choice" will be enhanced, asserts FRG Minister for Research and Technology, Heinz Riesenhuber, when presenting his ambitious plans for the space program. The "glory of an industrial nation" depends on it, he says. In addition, "confidence and pride" achieved through space exploration are "essential elements in the intellectual atmosphere of the laboratory". For this reason, the CDU-Minister wants to invest DM29 billion in the Ariane 5 rocket, the space shuttle Hermes and the space station Columbus by the year 2000. And that is only the first installment, because costs were calculated according to 1986 prices.

With his lofty plans, Riesenhuber has unconditionally adopted as his own the goals of ESA, the European Space Authority. Their program calls for neither an expansion nor a paring down--however, the Minister would like to squeeze out a few more millions. Doubts concerning the expenditure of billions of DM are dismissed as provincial: "Whoever spends his whole life in a kraal will never discover what lies on the other side of the hill" says ESA General Director Reimar Luest to justify the costly excursion into space. However, opposition is not coming from an African village but from a wicker beach chair: From St. Peter-Ording on the North Sea, Federal Finance Minister Stoltenberg makes it known that he is in no mood to be correcting Riesenhuber's press conferences every week. A decision about the space program will be made in cabinet session in Bonn this fall. End of discussion.

As eager as Riesenhuber is to secure an early commitment from future West German astronauts through discreet behind the scenes discussions or publicity-generating presentations, Stoltenberg remains stubborn: One of the Finance Minister's internal position papers states that "the usefulness of manned space flights still cannot be satisfactorily proven." The following questions remain unanswered:

- which products could be valuable so that their construction in space at exorbitant cost would be worthwhile
- why robots would not be used
- how the "financial dimensions of the space program plans can be brought into harmony with other priorities."

Stoltenberg, the sober accountant, picked to pieces "Riesenthaler and Co.'s" euphoric attitude towards participation in the space program: predictions that the earth will be divided into nations which have the capability to explore space and are, therefore, economically successful, and those who lack this capability and lag behind are, in Stoltenberg's opinion, nothing more than "brazen statements". Gaining a competitive edge over the United States and the USSR would be out of the question in view of their years of experience in space. In the face of so much uncertainty, he sees Riesenthaler's plan as an extremely ambitious goal which must first be carefully considered.

Stoltenberg is especially angered, however, by Riesenthaler's way of springing surprises; according to one Stoltenberg aide, "he is trying to be another Strauss." As recently as June, Stoltenberg made DM250 million available, because, as Riesenthaler put it, "necessary technical alterations to the Columbus, Ariane 5 and Hermes as well as additional safety requirements for the transport of astronauts required that the preparatory phase be extended until the end of this year." Now, eight weeks later, there is no more talk of preparation. Contrary to all verbal agreements, Riesenthaler has decided on a DM29 billion program and once again assigned to Stoltenberg the task of saving and trimming costs.

Stoltenberg's criticism is supported by the very sources which Riesenthaler uses to back his arguments. For example, Juergen Heraeus, director of the technology firm of the same name, says, "it would be a glaring mistake to support the space program". It would only benefit a few large companies who are already supported by state contracts and would, in the end, prevent highly qualified scientists and engineers who were subject to the pressure of the market from working on the project. But, then, the support of private industry is apparently not at issue here; for Franz Josef Strauss, whose hobbies include space research, Riesenthaler's mammoth space program would also be a vehicle for putting together a state-run aircraft and aerospace company according to Bavarian specifications. The CSU head's representative in Bonn, State Secretary Erich Riedl, eagerly encourages West German companies like MBB, Dornier, MTU and AEG to come together in such a way that they can enter the world market as joint partners--with participation from Daimler-Benz, Siemens and BMW if possible.

MBB, a striking example of a firm which, though technologically progressive, operates inefficiently, is applying pressure for movement in this direction. The West German space industry is said to lack a "clear leader"; for this reason, MBB Director Hanns Arnt Vogels said in a letter to his political foster-fathers in Munich: "the Federal Government is being called upon to support MBB as the leader among firms and in this way to strengthen the FRG's international standing." While MBB, bowing to Federal government pressure, has agreed to a "corporation which could be the foundation for a future Hermes GmbH" and which would have to include Dornier, MAN, AEG and ANT as equal partners, this would only mean "postponing an internal conflict within the West German industry until the actual development of Hermes."

Even now, other firms participating in the program were trying to get around such a role by MBB. In Vogels' opinion, a political statement by the Federal Government that the program will be headed by a major industrial contractor would be desirable.

The DM29 billion program alone is not enough for space program lobbyists. In their opinion, the development of a consolidated space industry would be greatly facilitated by something along the lines of a West German NASA. Riesenhuber has already sought expert opinion on this subject from Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft (IBAG--operating company of industrial enterprises). But there is still a hitch when it comes to translating this idea into reality.

Stoltenberg does not think much of these arguments either: The experts who support Riesenhuber's ideas would all benefit from a space program which was as comprehensive as possible. For this reason, they would be all too happy to explore "new fields of activity beyond nuclear energy" which could also be supported solely by tax money.

CSO: 36200002

## UNIONS TAKE STANDS ON NUCLEAR POWER

OeTV Position Uncertain

56200293 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 14 Jul 87 p 2

[Text] On Monday the executive board of the Public Service, Transportation and Communications Union (OeTV) dealt with the report of a commission of experts which had been charged with examining the basic conditions for abandoning nuclear energy. In Stuttgart an OeTV spokesman said that the commission had come to the conclusion "that in principle it is possible to abandon nuclear energy." The commission recommended to the OeTV executive board a change in the energy, economic and fiscal policy in order to be able to realize such a move as quickly as possible.

The spokesman confirmed that the experts had, however, also recommended completion of all power plants currently under construction and connecting them into the power network. Thus, the three nuclear power plants Isar II, Neckarwestheim II and Emsland should be completed and put into operation. This led to speculation that the OeTV would thus no longer be in a position to hold to the May 1986 decision of the DGB which requires abandoning nuclear power "as quickly as possible." In this connection the OeTV spokesman said that the political decision on "such an important question" was in the hands of OeTV's executive board. The political responsibility cannot be shifted from the specialists to a commission of experts. The executive board will make a decision on September 24th, specifying more precisely OeTV's recommendations on reorienting its energy policy by "abandoning nuclear energy as quickly as possible." It is questionable whether the executive board will adopt all the recommendations of the commission of experts, especially the one concerning completion of nuclear power plants. Moreover, to date the commission has presented only a preliminary report. The final report is yet to come.

The committee of experts is well balanced with representation of ecoinsitutes and power supply companies. They recommended to OeTV that it support broad social agreement in order to establish an important condition for abandoning nuclear energy.

As reported in Stuttgart, OeTV chairwoman Wulf-Mathies had a part in the decision that nuclear energy be abandoned as quickly as possible, with no

ifs, ands or buts. But she did not conceal the fact that she considered the 10-year timeframe suggested by the SPD to be too short.

Miners' Union Signals Acceptance

56200293 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 23 Jul 87 p 2

[Text] Christa Thoben, deputy chairman and economic policy spokesman of the CDU state parliament fraction in North Rhine-Westphalia, characterized the most recent recommendations of the Miners' Union as a significant contribution to the agreement on energy policy and as a clear rejection of all scenarios to avoid the issue. The Miners' Union did in fact suggest that during a transition period the share of nuclear power be reduced in favor of coal-produced power, yet it conceded that even after 2005 nuclear energy will play an important role in the energy supply. In the search for a new energy policy agreement the Miners' Union has thus courageously assumed a "pioneering role" among the trade unions. Even the SPD will now have to put its cards on the table and reveal the basis on which it is striving for a new energy policy agreement. SPD fraction chairman Farthmann has demanded that the state's power companies support the "interim plan" of the Miner's Union.

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## OUTLINE OF GOVERNMENT'S ECONOMIC POLICY

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 27 Aug 87 pp 2, 4

[Text] The controlled-progress philosophy espoused by the PCEDED will be followed by the Government in its entirety over the next 4 years, and private initiative will emerge as the prime mover of the Portuguese economy. This according to Cavaco Silva's Executive Program, which was announced yesterday at the Assembly of the Republic. The program contains a long section dealing with the economy. In today's edition, DIARIO DE NOTICIAS is publishing a summary of the main thrust of government and economic policies. Other aspects of the program will be discussed in later editions.

Under the Government's program, controlled-progress philosophy is "a blend of gradual change with public consensus, the only way to agree on goals such as economic growth, balancing foreign-trade payments, modernizing companies, increasing employment and slowing inflation, which to some extent are incompatible." Moreover, as the program states, this philosophy has been guiding economic policy since November of 1985.

"Modernize the country and create more wealth" is the theme of the economic section of the program. Running to a total of some 26,000 words, Cavaco Silva's economic program takes up 88 pages and is divided into 11 points, the most extensive of which deals with world economic policy and contains the passages about controlled-progress philosophy cited above.

Other aspects of the program include land-use planning, government-owned companies, the cooperative sector, agriculture, fishing, industry and energy, construction, transportation and communications, trade and tourism.

World Economic Policy. In the first 4 years, investment should show a real growth about twice the size of the gross national product, real growth will exceed the EEC average, and the source of this investment will be primarily the private sector. By 1990, the inflation rate should be more or less the same as that for the European Community. This will apply a moderating effect on consumption.

Monetary, Financial and Exchange Policy. The chief executive will implement a non-expansionist monetary policy over the next 4 years, assuring moderate consumption by the private sector. Mechanisms such as market interest taxes,

so-called open-market transactions taxes and cash reserve taxes will be seen.

Exchange policy will trend toward consolidating and expanding the domestic market, gradually liberalizing its operations, and when the escudo stabilizes, it will be incorporated into the European Monetary System.

Budget Policy. For the government, reducing the total debt of the public sector is an essential requirement for realizing its long-term and medium-term macroeconomic goals.

According to the chief executive, "Hard choices will have to be made to determine which government programs are absolutely necessary, and some basic decisions that may be painful in the first phases will have to be reached, but these choices will result later in a smoother and more rational functioning of the economy." The trend will be toward a gradual reduction of the government's role in the economy, in relative terms.

Tax Reform. There will be one income tax rate for singles (IRS) and another for families (IRC), which will replace the current system of figuring taxes by ID card.

Tax reform assumes a larger tax base and fewer exemptions due to the inclusion of new taxpayers, extension of the definition of profits to cover improved assets and reduction of tax incentives.

Tax revenues should "steadily increase" without worsening the tax burden, "because implementation of the tax reform should make it possible to reduce the actual tax burden on today's taxpayers without reducing total revenues."

Land Use Planning and Development. The goal is to optimize public investment in cooperation with the private sector and to utilize foreign resources (Community funds and financial instruments) more efficiently, expand and modernize production, raise the level of culture, create new employment opportunities, train personnel and correct regional imbalances.

The implementation of new methods to assist private productive investment, especially in the regional incentive system (tourism, telecommunications and energy) are another specific area of the program.

Government-Owned Businesses. The government is proposing a profound, resolute reform of the public-owned sector, but will proceed with consultation and dialog.

The government will recommend that the Assembly of the Republic approve the reorganization of government-owned companies into jointly owned public/private corporations, with the private party holding a minority interest and the government or government entity holding a majority interest. Recommendations will also be made to sell or trade public companies and acquire interest in new joint companies by contributing assets, and to dispose of corporate interest held by the government or government entities.

The government promises to proceed openly and properly in the privatization of all capital in order to protect the national interest.

**Cooperative Sector.** The cooperative sector will be consolidated and become more dynamic and efficient, particularly due to the larger role to be played by government institutions like the António Sérgio Institute.

"The cooperative sector will attempt to become more actively involved in regional development."

The periodic publication of current statistics and studies to gain a greater understanding of the national cooperative sector is another item being considered.

**Agriculture.** The government wants to encourage the stabilization of socio-economic relations in areas where the Agrarian Reform is being implemented by amending the Agrarian Reform Act. The government is also preparing other farm legislation on renting rural and forested land, the fragmentation of rural and forested land, and the cultivation of fallow land.

The government also wants to pay the former owners just compensation for nationalized or expropriated land and encourage the creation of proper channels for effectively leasing or selling state-owned land by public bidding.

**Fishing.** Undesirable fishing along the coast and in inland waters will be shifted farther offshore to catch other species of fish.

Scientific research will be supported and implemented to inventory resources located in the Portuguese Exclusive Economic Zone and along the coast in which the fishing industry is interested.

A national assistance program to restructure the small-scale fishing fleet will study the construction of safer boats that can sail farther, away from the areas inhabited by fry, as well as better conservation methods.

**Industry and Energy.** The government will stimulate the private sector to invest in the independent generation of electricity in order to utilize existing resources better. A new national energy plan will be drawn up together with other sectorial policies.

Direct business incentive policies will be formulated to encourage innovation and technological modernization and the creation of a diversified industrial and commercial base.

"Industrial policy will not be seen as a new expression of protectionism, but as the government's package of alternatives designed to respond to imperfections in today's markets."

**Transportation and Communication.** Liberalization of the intercity passenger and freight transportation market, transportation and communications cost

control measures and upgrading the national highways will be implemented in a new law regulating surface transportation. There will be a new national railroad plan and a new national highway plan.

In communications, "Most of the investment will come from the government, of course," but "areas in which private investment will be especially well received include ports and highway construction."

As far as transportation by sea is concerned, the government says that an effort will be made to publicize the potential of Portuguese ports abroad, and a policy of reducing port operating costs will be implemented concurrently.

In the area of air transportation, completion of expansion projects at the airports in Porto and Faro by 1989 is considered important. Modernization of Portela Airport in Lisbon will be continued even as studies on a new airport are being concluded.

Trade. Black marketeering and other irresponsible trade activities will be combated "with determination" in the interest of the consumer and legal trade to assure adequate supplies of quality merchandise at good prices.

Trade legislation will be revised gradually by eliminating bureaucratic excesses and state interference.

The selection of new products with an export potential will be supported, and the best terms will be assured for importing products the country needs.

Tourism. The main objective is to take advantage of all the potential opened up by Portugal's membership in the EEC and consolidate development throughout Portugal as harmoniously as possible to improve the problem of regional imbalance.

A tourism bill will be published to set forth the general principles for the development of the industry and its interrelationships with other sectors of the economy.

Improved investment terms, reorganization of supply in tourism, quality improvement, development of internal tourism and improved professional training are also planned.

Construction. Public works contracts will be extended, with the necessary adaptations, to public-owned companies, companies in which the government holds a majority interest and utility concessionnaires.

A new system for municipal approval of private services will be formulated and the general contract system for public works will be amended to fall under the authority of local officials.

8844  
CSO: 35420124

## RELATIONS WITH ARAB STATES APROPOS EEC

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 May 87 p 9

[Article by Yilmaz Oztuna]

[Text] The 19 Arab states (not counting Comoro Islands) constitute a large bloc situated between the Atlantic Ocean and the Persian Gulf, between Anatolia-Mediterranean and Middle Africa. Their collective population reaches 190 million. Their collective GNP is nearly \$400 billion. Of this, close to 30 percent belongs to Saudi Arabia. Their collective defense budget adds up to an astounding \$50 billion. Saudi Arabia and Iraq account for \$32 billion of that figure. Collectively, they keep 2 million soldiers under arms.

There is quite a bit of disparity between these countries. Egypt has a population of 50 million whereas Qatar has 300,000. In Mauritania and South Yemen the GNP is under \$1 billion. In Saudi Arabia it is \$110 billion, in Algeria \$50 billion and in Egypt \$35 billion. The disparity in per capita income is even more striking. It ranges between \$400 and \$20,000.

The collective GNP of the 19 Arab states equals that of Italy but is behind that of Britain, France or Federal Germany. More than half the \$400 billion derives from oil revenues, and that is a factor to be reckoned with.. None of the Arab countries is a democracy and none is industrialized.

Arab states are divided into two camps: conservative monarchies and progressive socialists. One camp looks toward Washington and the other to Moscow. of course, there are Western-oriented republics like Egypt and Tunisia. The Gulf monarchies display a relative stability. Socialist radicalism is as much a threat to their regimes as the Iranian menace, and that seems to help buttress their stability.

But the disagreements among the Arab states are not the kind that can be easily resolved. One can say that every one of them marches to a different drummer. This can be viewed as an indi-

cation that they are well on their way to becoming nation-states but that seems to elude most observers.

I want to say this: The unification movement notwithstanding the Arab states are rapidly growing apart. They are all becoming full-fledged states, gaining separate identities. They are becoming somewhat like the German-speaking countries--Federal Germany, East Germany, Austria, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein, which are all individual states. After a while unification of South and North Yemen will only be a dream. Just like Nicaragua and Honduras--both Spanish-speaking, Catholic, neighbors, and once living together... No one seriously considers that they might ever come together.

The Arabs are our religious kinsmen with whom we cohabited in this part of the world for something like 1,000 years. The great, rich and beautiful language that they speak is the medium through which the Koran descended. I would estimate that in the course of 10 centuries about 10 million Turks have melted into the Arab pot. Though not many, there are some Arabs who have been Turkified. Our cultures and ways of life are similar. Nearly all Arab states can trace their beginnings to the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empire.

That being said, Turkey can be part of this world, where things are not sweetness and light in any case, only to the extent of Arab intent and willingness. We cannot go any further than that nor would we want to.

Let us hope, God willing, that there will come about an Islamic Common Market. Turkey would promptly join. No one should doubt that. But, for an objective which is uncertain as to when or if it would come to pass, to say the least, we cannot be expected to give up on a goal of major import which has its timetable more or less settled. And as it so happens as an EEC member, Turkey would be in a position to make an even bigger contribution to the Islamic world when it becomes a member of the Islamic Common Market. Had their regimes been suitable, an Algeria or a Tunisia might have wanted to become part of the European Community.

12466  
CSO: 3554/266

## FINANCIAL JOURNAL SEES ECONOMY AS PRIMARY PROBLEM

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 8 May 87 p 1

[Text] The esteemed Prime Minister Ozal has been heard saying that the most important item on the country's agenda is the Constitution. That is certainly a debatable point. Does the problem really lie with the Constitution, or elsewhere? In our opinion resolving the issue of constitutional bans should not be all that hard. Therefore it is not entirely correct to view the constitutional issues as intractable problems.

The real problem, as in the past, comes from the economy. Looking at developments since last Sunday it can be seen how economic problems suddenly spilled over--when incentives for farmers and pay raises to public employees were brought to the fore. As the prospect of early elections is increasingly talked about, economic issues come to the fore. In a small town in the eastern region people have been out on the streets protesting the high cost of living. Inflation figures for the first 4 months of the year have brought forth talk of annulment of indexation. The Turkish lira is falling way down and as exports prove inadequate the black market is active again.

For ordinary citizens these realities loom ever larger. The black market, which officially does not exist, has spread from cement to paper and even to the automotive sector. The public is withdrawing its savings from the banks and looking for new ways to make ends meet. There is even anticipation about Cevher Ozden's [the Kastelli broker whose name was linked to financial scandals in the early eighties] rumored return.

When the businessman looks at the situation he sees the drop in the investment levels. He also sees that apart from a few privileged business groups favored by the government no one engages in investment. But the number of speculators is on the rise and prices of real estate are skyrocketing.

Workers, public employees and peasants are unhappy despite all the promises. Students are also restless, and there are indicators of localized incidents.

Those monitoring the macro indicators of the economy are becoming more worried. The budget deficit is growing, the balance of payments is getting out of control. Internal borrowing is being stimulated by the Karakaya bonds, and debt repayments can be considered only after that.

Yes, the most important issue in the country is not constitutional change but the economy. Things have unfortunately gotten out of hand. And the government is still ignoring the spend-thrift habits of the municipalities.

In this kind of environment, diverting public attention may bring some short-term benefit. Local elections or early election rumors may draw citizens' attention elsewhere. But all these cannot put an end to the worsening of the economy. It would only speed up the decline. Have you given any thought lately to what a re-elected ANAP government might be capable of doing?

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## REACTION TO OZAL'S AGRICULTURAL PACKAGE

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 6 May 87 p 12

[Text] Ankara--To ensure that the TL300 billion in supplementary funds, announced by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal as part of the 'agricultural package' during his press conference on Sunday does not constitute an added burden to the budget extra funds are to be raised. In coming days bond issues will be presented to the market. Prime Minister Ozal himself remarked at the press conference that, "With these bond issues we will be sparing the budget from further expenditures."

According to sources, a TL30 billion bond issue will be offered to the market. According to information received from Mass Housing and Public Administration Office, Karakaya Dam 'B' type bonds will be issued to the public on 11 May, at 40 percent interest. They will be issued by Ziraat Bank early next week.

There is word that further bond sales will be made in coming days involving various infrastructural investment projects. Officials said that some of the funds from the TL30 billion Karakaya issue will be transferred to Ataturk Dam (within the confines of the GAP project) and additional funds from new bond issues would also be channeled to Ataturk Dam. But, some of these funds which are "directed to energy-related investment projects, may be rechanneled into agriculture," officials pointed out.

## Foreign Currency Indexed Bonds

Officials at Public Partnership Agency are referring to the possibility of a new investment vehicle being marketed, in line with the prime minister's instructions. This might take the form of 'foreign currency indexed bonds.' This type of bond is designed to capitalize on the public's obvious interest in foreign currency. It will not be necessary to purchase the bonds with foreign currency. But the calculations will be made according to a foreign currency index, and repayments of principal will be made in terms of that index. It is expected that interest on

these 'indexed' bonds would be relatively low--around 10-15 percent.

#### PTT Investments Opened to Public

Meanwhile, it is learned that privatization of PTT assets is being speeded up. Prime Minister Ozal called PTT officials to his official residence on Sunday and 2 days ago to talk about the issue. Initially the bonds will cover telephone exchanges, sources say. According to PTT Director General Emin Baser since telephone exchanges are highly profitable their bond issues can be expected to be popular with the public. Thus, following bridge bonds and dam bonds PTT will join the select club of public corporations offering bond issues to the public.

#### Farmers Unhappy with Agricultural Package

The "agricultural package" announced by Prime Minister Turgut Ozal did not please farmers all that much. It appears that the agricultural sector is disappointed with the package, which was heralded as a major reform by Ozal while he was still in the United States in the wake of his by-pass operation.

Turkish Union of Chambers of Agriculture Chairman Osman Ozbek said that the much-heralded package turned out to be too small and contained too few of their demands. "A good number of our proposals were absent from the package. This can only be described as a mini package," Ozbek said.

#### Expectations and Outcome

Ozbek noted that a substantial gap existed between their expectations and the outcome. He pointed out that there was no reference to subsidized prices for eight of the 1987 crops. He went on to say:

The subsidies are between 18 and 28 percent for 1987. We believe that inflation will top that figure. Subsidies ought to be reviewed. On the positive side, the package introduces some new things concerning fertilizers and subsidies, and giving credit to farmers without mortgage has been accepted. But the importation of animal products is continuing. The farmer, facing a compounded debt where his interest is 2-3 times the principal, is still in shock. We find it regrettable that the package makes no mention of any plan for the shutdown enterprises to be reopened, or that debts are being taken care of. We would have expected to see compounded interests written off. Ziraat Bank is loaning at 22 percent to some farmers and has agreed to the rescheduling of debts but that is not enough. The state should have agreed to absorb the accumulated interest debt, and that which should have been in the package.

## Taxing At Source Should Be Ended

Ozbek maintained there was no comfort on the tax front either, and went on to say:

"We have been insisting that 'taxing at the source' should be ended. This has not been done. There has not been a reduction either. Apart from grains, we have not heard any word that payments would be made up front. One positive thing is getting credit without mortgage which will go some way toward freeing the farmer from the usurer and lending some measure of dignity to him. But we do not think it will work since they operate without invoices. In any case TL600,000 will not go all that far."

## What Support?

Commenting on Prime Minister Ozal's statement that "agriculture is the sector receiving the most support," Ozbek responded:

"We do not quite understand what kind of support this is. They say agricultural sector has received TL700 billion in support payments but no one makes any mention of the TL700 billion that goes to paying back interest. A farmer cannot live by fuel and fertilizer alone. Tractor prices have gone up 100 percent in 1 year, prices of other inputs have gone up similarly. Before everything else, they should do something about the price hikes that come every 2 months or so."

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## HUNGER STRIKING STUDENTS PROTEST TURBAN BAN

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 8 May 87 p 12

[Text] While the hunger strike over the turban ban continues, there is new hope for the turbanned students. Students at Ankara University Faculty of Divinity say they got a promise from ANAP Secretary General Mustafa Tasar about 'wearing headcover at school.' Meanwhile, students at the Aegean and 9 September universities said they would also go on hunger strike in sympathy with their fellow students in Ankara. Students from various universities in Istanbul came in front of Istanbul University to continue their 'sit in.'

## Tasar's Visit

Secretary General Tasar met with the 30 hunger strikers at Faculty of Divinity. Tasar told the students that the matter would be resolved quite soon, and that he was closely watching the problem. Later, together with two turbanned students and a male student, Tasar went to see Faculty Dean Prof Meliha Ambacioglu. Talking to the dean for a while Tasar offered no comment on the meeting. But it was learned that he told the dean he would like to see the students be allowed to enter classes with headcover and that the rights of suspended students should be restored.

## Cansizoglu's Visit

Deputy Engin Cansizoglu (ANAP-Zonguldak), who has been going in and out of the Assembly without wearing a tie as a protest against the headcover ban (subsequently becoming the focus of controversy) visited the students at the Faculty of Divinity yesterday. He told the students, "I hear you are being told everything is O.K. so you should be entering classes. But do not end the strike before you get a firm settlement." He added that until the matter is resolved he would continue to go to the Assembly without a tie on.

IDP Leader Aykut Edibali also protested the turban ban and the pressures put on the turbanned students.

### Five Students Hospitalized

Another of the hunger strikers became ill and was taken to Gazi University Faculty of Medicine Hospital. Four students, two of them girls, are hospitalized so far. And 30 students are continuing with the hunger strike.

### Support from Izmir

Students at Aegean and 9 September universities have also started a hunger strike in sympathy with their friends in Ankara. It is also said that the students have started a door-to-door campaign to secure votes for ANAP in the next elections.

### In Istanbul

Meanwhile, students from universities all over Istanbul continued their "sit in" in front of Istanbul University. Numbering about 30, female and male, the students have their parents and guardians supporting them. They have started a signature collection campaign "open to students and guardians" protesting the turban ban. The students were showered with flowers by visitors. They are also receiving support from many organizations and individuals. A group of students from Antalya students residence presented the protesters with a copy of the Constitution "under lock and key"--to signify its "non-implementation."

### Gift of Koran

Meanwhile, the deputy leader of the Prosperity Party, Bahri Zengin, and the party's Istanbul branch chairman Tayyip Erdogan visited the students. Zengin presented the students with a copy of the Koran and a headscarf. Breaking the Ramadan fast at Beyazit Square, the turbaned students are expected to continue their protest today.

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TURKEY

SOCIAL

BRIEFS

DEPUTY PROTESTS 'DOUBLE STANDARD' IN DRESS CODES -- ANAP Deputy Engin Cansizoglu, who has been giving notice to the press throughout the week that he was about to engage in a protest action at the Assembly, finally consummated the action but in a "hit-and-run" fashion. Cansizoglu had attended the 23 April reception without wearing a tie to protest against the turban ban. He entered the Assembly chambers in similar attire, taking a seat in the back rows. Doing his best to be noticed from the press gallery, he left the chamber upon realizing that SDPP deputies had noticed his presence. Later, standing near the ANAP caucus room, he began distributing a prepared statement to journalists in which he declared: "So long as the double standard remains in effect and the headcover ban is not terminated I will not be wearing a tie. I, too, voted yes for the Constitution and for Kenan Evren's presidency. Now I am protecting the Constitution just as Mr Evren says we should do." [Text] [Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 May 87 p 6] 12466

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